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ABSTRACT
A NOVEL E-VOTING SYSTEM WITH DIVERSE SECURITY FEATURES
by
Haijun Pan

Internet-based E-voting systems can offer great benefits over traditional voting machines
in areas, such as protecting voter and candidate privacy, providing accurate vote counting,
preventing voter fraud, and shortening the time of vote counting. This dissertation
introduces, establishes and improves Internet-based E-voting systems on various aspects of
the voting procedure. In addition, our designs also enable voters to track their votes which
is a very important element in any elections.
Our novel Internet-based E-voting system is based on the following realistic
assumptions: (1) The election authorities are not 100% trustworthy; (2) The E-voting
system itself is not 100% trustworthy; (3) Every voter is not 100% trustworthy. With these
three basic assumptions, we can form mutual restrictions on each party, and secure
measurements of the election will not be solely determined and influenced by any one of
them. The proposed scheme, referred to as Time-lock algorithm based E-voting system
with Ring signature and Multi-part form (TERM), is demonstrated to achieve the goal of
keeping votes confidential and voters anonymous, as well as reducing the risk of leaking
the voters’ identities during the election. In addition, TERM can prevent any possible clash
attack, such as manipulating voting results or tampering voters’ original votes by malicious
election authorities or hackers. The security performance analysis also shows that TERM
provides outstanding measurements to secure the candidates’ manifest on each type of

ballots during the whole election duration. TERM provides a roadmap for future fair
elections via Internet.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Objective
Today’s society is experiencing an explosive growth in Internet-based applications and
systems where a large number of social activities are performed online. However, most
of the political elections in either developed or developing countries are still carried out
using paper-based or touch screen voting systems where the voters need to cast their votes
at a precinct. This maybe a major contributing factor in low voter turnout in elections. A
reliable and secure Internet-based Electronic voting (E-voting) system would provide
voters with greater convenience and more accurate vote counting process. In the
meantime, the significant demand from launching a reliable and secure E-voting system
has driven efforts from researchers for years. Although paper-based voting systems have
been successfully deployed for a long time, the U.S. government has been looking into
improving the security and accuracy of E-voting in order to avoid disputes over paperbased voting system before/during/after an election. For instance, in Volusia County in
Florida on election night November 2000, the main concern was with whether or how
voters’ votes would be accurately counted in an election. There was a big dispute in
Florida and election authorities in many counties were called to recount the votes. As we
know, traditional voting machines with paper ballots inevitably yield a certain rate of
misreading on the ballot. Meanwhile, using paper ballots or machine readable paper
ballots could incur huge delay and human errors of tallying results. For example, in
Minnesota, there was a recount and ensuing court case after Election Day because many
miscounted ballots were discovered among the voting machines that were jammed. So
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far, in the United States, the concept of E-voting has only been applied in some local
governments’ electronic voting machines. Typical electronic voting procedures include
setting up electronic voting machines and casting electronic ballots by touch screen
devices. During recent U.S. presidential election held from the last decade, most states
were still employing the traditional voting machines or ballot scanners with a few
exceptions which adopted touch screen voting machines to let voters cast their ballots
electronically.
The objective of my research is concentrated on developments of Internet-based
E-voting systems in the following areas:
•

Novel electronic ballot design

•

Reliable vote counting and vote tracking algorithms

•

Information security features in E-voting system

•

Cryptograph based voter privacy protection scheme

•

Clash attack prevention

1.2 Challenges
The E-voting procedure raises legitimate concerns about its reliability and trustworthiness
when millions of voters cast their ballots over the Internet. Meanwhile, there are still
many open issues about E-voting through the Internet. Other works have reviewed many
concerns about the Internet E-voting, such as reliability of software, data transmission,
database systems, confidentiality of electronic votes, detection on double voting, and vote
buying (Wu, 2002). These concerns are aligned with the major issues of Internet attacks
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around the globe.
Before Internet-based E-voting systems can completely replace those traditional
paper- based voting systems, we need to make sure that the new system will perform as
efficiently as the traditional ones without any security and technical concerns.
Nonetheless, here are some major challenges for researchers and authorities to deploy the
Internet-based E-voting system:
First, the trust from the public and the government is the cornerstone of any
Internet-based E-voting system. It also serves as an important precondition to widely
adopting this kind of E-voting system. During the 2000 U.S. presidential election, the
recounting of votes and disputes in Florida demonstrated that it was time-consuming and
could yield a certain error rate during the vote counting procedure for the machinereadable paper ballot based voting system. Therefore, it is critical that the future
developed E-voting system must be secure, effective and flawless. To increase public
confidence, many states have been considering E-voting systems that provide voterverifiable paper audit trails. Some efficient E-voting systems with higher vote counting
rates have been proposed recently.
Second, the reliability of online data transactions is worrisome to many users.
Online data hacking and data breach incidents have been occurring at an alarming rate.
Although the newly designed E-voting system can collect ballots quickly and count votes
efficiently, it still relies on the Internet as the communication medium. Numerous
concerns regarding communications among voters, authorities and E-voting systems
through the Internet must be addressed. The new E-voting system must be able to prevent
hackers from conducting online cyberattacks such as unauthorized access to the system
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and votes, maliciously jamming the data traffic resources, etc. The Internet-based Evoting system must incorporate advanced data transmission technologies and improved
security algorithms to detect and deter malicious online activities.
The third critical concern is the trustworthiness of E-voting system’s designer and
manufacturer. Although E-voting systems vendors advertise that the whole procedure of
vote casting and ballot collecting is securely monitored and guaranteed during the
election, but the public still lacks the confidence of these systems and they believe that
the whole election procedure should be monitored and guarded by the public themselves.
In this dissertation, our research works mainly focus on developing an E-voting system
without fully relying on the trustworthiness of the election authorities and voting system.
We have developed the measurements to place mutual restrictions among voters and
authorities and vendors to ensure a fair election.
Despite the challenges listed above, why shall we continue to develop and deploy
Internet-based E-voting systems? Besides having the benefit of highly efficient vote
counting process and saving resource, it offers the opportunity to achieve an out-standing
performance level over traditional voting in many aspects, such as the system can allow
voters to self-correct on their own voting mistakes which may result in an invalid vote,
the system will prevent multiple votes from the same voter, it also shorten the time for
counting and retrieving the voting result.

1.3 Assumptions
Most importantly, the political election should be conducted fairly, transparently and
honestly under the supervision of the election authority. But from past experiences, voters
have concerns about whether their votes were accurately counted or have been

4

manipulated during the election (Cranor, 1997). At the same time, source codes embedded
in the voting machines are usually proprietary, the programming and processes are always
under a veil of secrecy.
In this dissertation, we developed several novel E-voting models, NOTE (Name
and vOte separaTed E-voting system), E-NOTE (Enhanced Name and vOte separaTed Evoting system), RE-NOTE (Ring signature based Enhanced Name and vOte separated Evoting system) , M-NOTE (Multi-part Ballot based Name and vOte separated E-voting
system) and TERM (Timed-lock algorithm based E-voting system with the Ring
signature certificate and Multi-part ballot form), which can better address the voting
issues discussed above.
Our research works make the following tenable assumptions:
1. The election authorities are not fully trustworthy, which is a reasonable and
practical concern from the public.
2. The E-voting system itself is not fully trustworthy.
3. The voters are not fully trustworthy.
4. Data transmission through the Internet is reliable. Our research will only focus on
the overall picture of designing the voting protocol and voting scheme.
With these four basic assumptions, we can easily form some mutual restrictions
among each party involved in the whole voting scheme, and the secure measurement of
the E-voting system will not be solely determined and influenced by any of them. In
addition, our proposed E-voting system model will allow voters to have more auditing
capabilities in terms of vote counting and tracking during and after the election.
We have gradually introduced, established and improved the Internet-based Evoting system, including the solution to maintain candidates’ and voters’ confidentiality,
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to protect voters’ privacy, and to empower voters to do vote tracking and verification,
which are three most important elements in any political election. The corresponding Evoting system model has well been illustrated to mitigate underlying issues discussed
above.
A typical voting model may endow several responsibility roles of an election such
as registration, vote counting, and vote tally to a single entity. Since a political election is
a complicated procedure which requires security measurements at every step of the
process. We will introduce a voting protocol that contains several distinguished phases:
voter registration, ballot distribution, voter casting, ballot collecting, vote counting, vote
tally publishing, and vote auditing.
Any voting data breach that happens in any of phases in a political election will
lead to an invalid election result. In the past, many researchers mainly focused on the
cryptography design or its suitability for E-voting. Our works are mainly focused on
finding a practical solution to improve the E-voting system and prevent it from being
hacked or manipulated by different malicious parties. Our research goal is to design an
E-voting system model that would incorporate existing cryptographic algorithms so that
it is secure and provisions vote audit capability instead of inventing a new mathematical
cryptography method. We expect such a secure E-voting system model will also draw
high participating rate from voters in the future.
In Chapter 2, we will review the background of our research in terms of
cryptography and protocol. We will also introduce attacks on the existing E-voting
scheme, and we also generalize the basic requirements for setting up an E-voting system
with fairness and transparency.
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In Chapter 3, we introduce our previous works including NOTE, E-NOTE, RENOTE, M-NOTE with paper ballot mode for readers’ better understanding. We also
introduce useful definitions which are used in TERM for the preliminaries.
In Chapter 4, we will give a detailed illustration of every step in TERM to achieve
a secure and accurate voting process. Each step will illustrate a specific measurement to
guarantee the voting operation.
We also give details on the mathematical and security analysis of TERM and other
proposed works in Chapter 5 and 6 to provide a full detailed description of the proposed
E-voting system. In Chapter 7, we will conclude our works and discuss the different
aspects of E-voting system that need to be considered for elections in the future.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATUR REVIEW

2.1 Cryptography Used In E-voting System
In this chapter, we summarize related works on E-voting systems in terms of encryption
algorithm. Generally, researchers have categorized existing E-voting systems into three
major types: blind signature based scheme, homorphic-based scheme, and mix-nets based
scheme.
Blind signature is a kind of digital signature that can be used in an E-voting system
to better protect a voter’s privacy (Chaum, 1983), (Chien, 2001). Several blind signature
based E-voting systems have been proposed and the common main idea is to allow a
signer (voter) to transmit any important voting message (ballot) anonymously. However,
messages are only sealed and encrypted in one direction. It is not traceable in the sense if
it is used in elections that a voter cannot reverse the encryption process when vote audit
is needed.
Homorphic cryptography is the second most popular encryption used in E-voting
systems (Benaloh, 1987). It allows the cipher text to carry some specific computations
before an encrypted message is generated. This message can later be decrypted and
audited to see whether it matches the result of the same operations performed on the
original plaintext.
Consider an example in which the voter has two options {1,-1}, which stand for
two different candidates in the race, and there are several voters casting their ballots in
the election. The Homomorphic cryptography based scheme will calculate the sum of
votes to determine the final result. If the sum of the votes for a specific candidate is larger
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than 0, then this candidate is considered as the winner. Otherwise, this candidate will be
considered as to concede the election. If there are more than two candidates or options in
the election, then it is more complicated to determine the final result of the election by
using the homomorphic based voting scheme.
This type of scheme still exhibits drawbacks such as limited scalability; usually,
it can accommodate only two options for voting, but a typical poll has more than two
options.
Mixnets allows messages to be encrypted with different servers and random
patterns (Chaum, 1981). Ideally, it does not enforce a final encryption form except for an
original encryption since the message could be encrypted infinitely.
There are, however, various issues and technical challenges associated with each
type of cryptographic methods mentioned above. They must be solved before they can be
implemented in E-voting systems so that voters are confident enough to vote through the
Internet. In addition, a summary of practical issues in E-voting procedure such as voting
manipulation, voting fraud, data transferring through the Internet, and database
maintenance are discussed (Jakobsson, 2004). Still, ideas from other designs may have
the influence on the current and future trend of E-voting system development.

2.2 Other Researchers’ Work
Over the past two decades, there have been many papers focusing on E-voting issues as
technological advances seem matured enough to warrant transition from traditional voting
methods to electronic ones. Currently, the most widely used “Direct Recording
Electronic” (DRE) voting system focuses on facilitating voters to cast paperless ballots
on specific voting machines. In general, this type of new machines essentially replaces
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paper ballots with electronic ones. Other researchers are advocating for the Internet
voting, and our works are also tailored for the Internet voting environment. Several
research works have focused on the voting security issues during the data encryption
process.
We will categorize other researchers’ work by analyzing the voting mechanism
used in the voting procedure. The typical design of a voting system can be categorized
into paper ballot based, electronic machine based, and the Internet-based E-voting system.
We focus on online E-voting activities because we believe that “vote through the Internet”
will evolve into a normal life style soon in a similar way as online banking and online
shopping that the public does nowadays. We also list several works from other researchers
that may have some common properties regarding security and privacy concerns.
Helios is the first online E-voting system and it is web based and offers the great
flexibility for voters to vote online with open audit function (Adida, 2008). Every voter
will be provided a tracking number to audit the result.
The FOO system is composed of voter, authentication authority, and counting
authority in the whole voting procedure (Fujioka, 1992). This protocol also contains four
phases: Initialization, Registration, Voting, and Counting phases. The author also claimed
the vote check function can be achieved to ensure the vote verifiability.
Punchscan is a kind of voting scheme while the ballot is designed with top and
bottom sheet of a ballot (Chaum, 2006), (Popvenuic, 2006). This system provides a voterverifiable scheme to allow voters audit. The Pret a Voter Verification Election System has
also suggested the idea of using the mix server cryptography for voters and public to
randomly check and audit the ballot (Ryan, 2009). In reality, if every voter appears at the
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voting booth and manually verifies and checks the plain ballot before casting, the total
duration time of one voter in a voting booth will be longer than normal and will cause
more delay and energy consumption in a large scale presidential election.
The Threeballot system is a paper ballot based system that the whole voting
system does not need any cryptography (Rivest, 2006). If a voter selects a candidate,
he/she will randomly fill two out of all three ballots for this candidate. Any candidate,
who receives only one vote out of three ballots, is considered vetoed by this voter. This
scheme has simplified the voting process but its lack of traceability does not meet the intime demand from voters in today’s democratic society.

2.3 Clash Attack
Besides the cryptography and voting process concerns we discussed above, the public
also has concerns about corruption, fraudulent and manipulation from authorities in the
election. Potential attacks from election authorities could be a big threat to true
democracy. Previously most researchers only consider risks from external factors such
as voting system glitch, message transmission error, etc. We also consider issues related
to the voting authorities that may happen.
The concept of Clash attack on E-voting system was first introduced by (Kuesters,
2011). It is a kind of attack that can undermine the verifiability in an election and it usually
involves malicious authorities who want to manipulate the voting result. When an election
is held through the Internet, the verifiability which is the basic requirement for running
any modern E-voting system, becomes a very important security concern. Clash attack
may occur and undermine the verifiability in the election and this kind of attack usually
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involves malicious authorities that could manipulate the voting result without the public
knowing. It is one of the highly concerned attacks that have drawn great interest from
many researchers in this field. Suppose there is at least one malicious authority that exists
and actively participates in the election, if this malicious authority plays an important
role, it may impact the voting result significantly. The malicious authority can generate
the same receipt to different voters during the vote casting phase. Meanwhile, it can safely
replace any vote with its own favor and eventually can manipulate the election without
being detected during the vote auditing phase. Thus, resolving this issue is another
imperative requirement for setting up a modern E-voting system. To demonstrate this,
we will give a detailed example later to show how the malicious authority uses this kind
of attack to manipulate the election voting result. Another possible attack from malicious
authority will be discussed in Chapter 3.
Consider the following scenario:
Malicious authority such as VCC counts the vote with its favorite candidate even
when voters have their vote receipt (confirmation number or tracking number) from the
authority, it still could not prevent malicious behaviors happening because the authority
can generate the duplicated receipt more than once to different voters when their votes
are being inquired.
When voters verify his/her own vote, since he/she has the same receipt as other
voters, the result he/she checked might be that of another voter who has the exact same
choices on candidates in the election, and his/her vote might not be actually counted.
We need to set up a mechanism to enable voters to track their own votes and audit
the voting result with great flexibility as well as anonymity. Thus how to balance between
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traceability and anonymity is what we need to focus on. In our system, we introduce the
concept of voting receipt with a confirmation number to serve for both tracking and clash
attack prevention purpose. As we mentioned above, a voter casts their votes to the
authority, VCC, along with a unique confirmation on each ballot. The confirmations
could be either generated from authorities’ pre-set pool or voters could revise them.
During the ballot distribution phase, every voter is assigned a set of unique confirmations
along with his/her assigned ballot and they can either accept or modify these pre-set
confirmations. The confirmation used by voters must be unique throughout the whole Evoting system, and the voter may apply that randomly on any assigned ballot. The unique
confirmation chosen by the voters will be printed on every cast ballot upon casting.

2.4 Basic Requirements for Setting Up an E-voting System
Our integrated approach takes into account when there are untrustable authorities,
untrustable systems and untrustable voters.
The following important features must be absolutely provisioned for setting up a
fair election:
Anonymity: To maintain the anonymity of voters, the voting protocol must allow
voters to request the ballot anonymously because authorities are not assumed to be
trustworthy and in fact may violate the anonymity rule in the election. A malicious
authority refers to any official entity such as Election Committee (EC), BDC or Vote
Counting Committee (VCC) that might turn to be malicious in the election. With a
malicious authority, if the voter requests the ballot by showing his/her identity, the ballot
could be associated with this specific voter by the malicious BDC and eventually the
voting content could be compromised. It is crucial that personal information exposure be
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limited. In one of our E-voting system models, we use a ring signature based scheme
during the ballot distribution phase. We also respect both candidates’ and voters’
anonymity, and design a voting scheme that will dissociate each candidate and its
corresponding vote on the ballot to keep candidates anonymous to possible malicious
authority (VCC) during the vote counting phase, and keep voters anonymous to the
possible malicious authority and the public during the ballot distribution and auditing
phase. The E-voting schemes with different features will be further elaborated in Chapter
3.
Confidentiality: Who a voter voted for should be known to this specific voter
only. This principle must be mandatorily applied in any political election, and this basic
election rule must be strictly obeyed by all authorities and E-voting system designers. In
this dissertation, we have assumed untrusted or malicious authorities in the election, and
they may unlawfully and secretly link a voter’s identity with his/her assigned ballot so
that they could track the votes. This is an obvious consequence of protocol breach. Our
goal is to completely block any unauthorized association between voters and their
corresponded votes to ensure confidential deliveries of the votes to the final tally.
Verifiability: This refers to the match between any cast ballot and the
corresponding voter’s record in the vote auditing phase. The step of vote verification and
audit is much more stringent, as voters cast the vote and election authorities must
accurately count the vote. Usually, two aspects of veriﬁability are defined, individual
verifiability and universal verifiability. Our E-voting system models can satisfy these two
aspects of verifiability to allow voters to audit and verify both their own votes and the
system-wide voting result easily. We have further detailed discussion in the later chapters.
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Invariability: Although our previous works have well illustrated a fair election in
terms of various security measurements, there are many remaining challenges throughout
the whole voting process. For example, the voting protocol will be breached if a malicious
authority manipulates the manifest of candidates’ permutation on each type of ballot to
favor a certain candidate instead of changing the votes. It is important that in a Name and
vote separated E-voting system, the permutation of candidates’ identities on each type of
ballot should be fixed to stabilize a vote counting process for mapping all types of ballot
and candidate identities during the whole election. Hence, our E-voting system models
have incorporated the measurement to ensure the manifest of the candidates’ permutation
is unchanged from the beginning to the end of the election. We will discuss this kind of
attack in Chapter 3.
Efficiency: Every voter can independently and simultaneously obtain his/her
ballot before voting, and thus the entire time frame for vote collecting and counting can
be greatly shortened. In general, an Internet-based election held online can reduce
required resources and complete the whole voting procedure easier than the one based on
any other mediums.
Multiple or repeated vote casting prevention: As the election is held through the
Internet, the voting process must be able to prevent a voter from voting multiple times or
voting repeatedly in different states (batches). A watchdog device is introduced in our
proposed scheme can record and monitor voting transactions. This solution will be further
elaborated in Chapter 3.
From Chapter 3 onwards, the term “E-voting” specifically refers to the voting
process being held through the Internet.

15

CHAPTER 3
PROPOSED WORK AND OUR CONTRIBUTIONS

This dissertation mainly focuses on safety concerns and practical problems arising from
implementing an E-voting system. In this chapter, we will present our works by showing
how different technologies and protocols are integrated into our designed E-voting system
model. Since the E-voting system is a complicated system, any breach in any phase in
terms of voting data, security, voter privacy, voter anonymity and voting accuracy will
eventually ruin the whole election, and thus we have to consider every detail in the
process to ensure the operation is secure. In each section, specific measurements are
applied to ensure a secured and accurate voting process and will address all safety issues
and concerns as discussed in the previous chapter.
We will first illustrate terms and technologies used in our proposed schemes in
the paper ballot based mode. Our proposed idea will also work in electronic mode.
Note that the variable definitions used in each section are independent of other
sections.

3.1 Name and Vote Separated E-voting system (NOTE)
It is necessary to disassociate the candidate and the voter’s vote to ensure the anonymity
of candidates because election authorities are considered potentially malicious. If a
candidate is associated with a vote on the ballot received at the VCC side, there could be
an obvious weakness that can be exploited by the malicious VCC in the vote counting
phase. Punchscan and Voter Pret may have the similar ballot form with the one in our
proposed system but our research work presents the ballot in a different way as it features
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voter’s self-decision power and ballot simplicity. We list a series of sample ballots in
Figure 3.1. There are β candidates and φ types of ballot (1≤ |φ|≤ β!), and β checkboxes.
The checkbox on each row on the ballot indicates whether this associated candidate is
voted for or not. Here, we set β to 3 and φ to 6 (3!). Then six types of ballots corresponding
to six unique permutations of a three-candidate race. Every ballot is distinguished by a
marker (indicated by the blackened area on the top right side of a ballot) that is not visible
to voters nor VCC (who can only see the type of the ballot in an encrypted form). This
marker represents the type of the ballot and it can be numbers or letters depending on the
encryption method. Figure 3.2 shows the ballots after they have been marked and the
ballots are torn into two parts. The main purpose of using this type of ballots is allowing
candidates to be anonymous when the vote is collected and counted by VCC in the vote
counting phase.
We will illustrate a kind of attack while all ballots in the election only contain a
fixed permutation of candidates without applying the Name and Vote separated voting
scheme: If VCC is malicious and even if the vote is not shown with a candidate, when
VCC counts votes of a candidate who is not a favorite of VCC, since the candidate
permutation is fixed, VCC can easily locate this specific candidate’s vote on the casted
ballot and might have a chance to change or manipulate it during the vote counting phase.
No matter how many percentages of total votes could be successfully altered by malicious
authority VCC, the true and fair democracy has been breached. This is a form of attack to
be deterred by applying the Name and Vote Separated E-voting scheme.
This scheme is suitable for voting through the Internet since the ballot separation
procedure can be easily achieved digitally. The proposed scheme is distributed, has a
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collusion-resistant mechanism for E-voting and is capable of maintaining the voters’
confidentiality. We require that EC and VCC are independent of each other. EC and VCC
will never be in collaboration or coercion. For example, in a U.S. presidential election,
the two major parties can take the responsibility of EC and VCC separately, or the two
parties will supervise EC and VCC together. At this moment, we will discuss further
serious situations in the later charters.
There are numbers of differences between NOTE and other existing schemes such
as punchscan and three-ballots voting system:
NOTE is based on the Internet voting media where as punchscan is designed for
the DRE voting system which uses machine-scan paper ballots. The three-ballot scheme
is also based on the paper ballot mode.
In punchscan and three-ballot voting scheme, there is only one official Election
Authority (EA) that supervises the whole voting procedure. EA is also in charge of
distributing ballots, collecting vote and counting the final tally. NOTE has two different
and independent authorities, EC and VCC, the role of EC and VCC is very important in
the voting procedure. They are independent and can monitor to each other.
The voters and the candidates in the punchscan and three-ballot scheme are partial
auditors for the election; EA will generate at least twice the number of ballots in the
election. There is also a pre-election step allowing the voters and the candidates to check
the ballot. This feature is probably not needed for the Internet voting which NOTE uses
since the data transaction will be at least doubled than it is expected. The goal of NOTE
is to protect candidate’s anonymity, reduce internet traffic during voting and offer the
same secure level as provided by the traditional paper ballot mode and DRE mode.

18

Another serious issue is that the most of existing E-voting machines and their
source codes are not published. The public has concerns about whether the voting
procedure is really fair and transparent or not, and how the particular type of E-voting
system is chosen. Is there any political reason or pressure in the decision of the committee
in choosing a particular voting machine? This is another important reason we need to
introduce NOTE. Because the candidate identity can be well protected through this
protocol since it is disassociated the relationship between the candidates in the race and
their received vote during the vote counting phase.
To make it easier to follow, we will illustrate the operation of our model with the
paper ballot mode first and then we will discuss the same procedure in the E-voting mode.
Consider a small class election that Alice, Bob and Charlie are the candidates for the
president of the student association. There are several identified students as voters in the
classroom; two students are in charge of counting the votes. We do not know whether
these two students are good friends of Alice, Bob, or Charlie. We assume these two
students who play the role of VCC are not 100% trustable. Since we have three
candidates, there are 3! permutations in ordering the candidates on the ballot. The teacher
may generate more than 3! ballots, each displaying one of the 3! permutations with a
marker. For illustrative purposes and to be able to resolve possible contention in the final
tally counting process, the teacher generates 3! distinct ballots as shown in Figure 3.1,
and gives each voter one plain ballot.
Figure 3.1 shows the six possible ordering of the candidates’ names on each ballot;
there is also a hidden marker (covered with the black area) on every ballot to
indicate/index the type of the ballot. Each type of ballots may use a set of distinct
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markers. If there are n candidates for the election, there will be n! different types of
ballots. When a voter casts his/her votes, the voter must separate the ballot into two parts
as shown in Figure 3.2 and 3.3. Then, voters should submit the right part of the ballot as
shown in Figure 3.3 to the two students acting as VCC to count the votes (the types of the
ballots are hidden, and still remain unknown at this time). Voters also give the left part of
the ballot to the teacher to collect. After receiving all right-part of ballots, these two
students who are in charge of counting will unveil the hidden marker of every ballot as
shown in Figure 3.4. Since the ballots being counted do not contain the candidates’ names,
implying that they do not know the names of candidates 1, 2 and 3. These two students
only tabulate how many votes are for each candidate (1, 2 and 3; names of candidates
remain anonymous) in each type of ballots. When this step is completed, the two students
will pass the tally results of votes for each type of ballots to the teacher. The teacher will
reveal the hidden marker of each type of ballot, and calculate the final result for each
candidate. Note that we may actually have more than six distinct hidden marker types
while there are several ones referring to a same sequence of candidates which is one type
of the six (3!) in total.
The novelty of this scheme is that the ballot is separated into two parts; one part
contains the list of the candidates in some random order (the identification of this order
is hidden), and the other one is for the choice from voters. Note that each ballot is counted
by VCC on the voter’s choice and the sequence type, and the candidate names and other
information are not revealed to VCC.
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1. Alice

1

1. Bob

1

2. Bob

2

2. Alice

2

3. Charlie

3

3. Charlie

3

1. Charlie

1

1. Alice

1

2. Alice

2

2. Charlie

2

3. Bob

3

3. Bob

3

1. Bob

1

1. Charlie

1

2. Charlie

2

2. Bob

2

3. Alice

3

3. Alice

3

Figure 3.1 Sample ballots for a three candidate race.

1. Alice
2. Bob
3. Charlie

Figure 3.2 Left part of the ballots with candidate names.

1

A

2

3

Figure 3.3 Right part of the ballots with vote choice.
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F
D

E

C
B
1

A

2

3

Figure 3.4 Ballots with marker type revealed
when two students count the vote.

The procedure in the Internet voting mode of the proposed E-voting scheme
(Figure 3.5) can be summarized as follows.
EC receives the registration from a voter; it will verify and determine whether the
voter is eligible to receive a ballot to vote. After the verification, EC sends an encrypted
ballot through the Internet to the voter. The original format of the ballot prior to
encryption is { c, t }, where the array c = (c[1],c[2],...,c[n]) denotes the names of the
candidates, t

denotes the marker which determines the type of the ballot, and n is the

number of candidates running for the election.
We use the RSA algorithm (note that other encryption may be adopted) to encrypt
all data for transmission (Chien, 2001). Then, EC sends the encrypted ballot { C ,T} to
the voter where C = (C[1], C[2],....C[n]) ; at the voter side, they can use the public key to
recover array c by decrypting C, but the marker T remains hidden.
After casting the vote, the binary array D = ( D[1], D[2],..., D[n]) will be generated by
the voter’s choices. A “1” stands for voting for YES; a “0” stands for voting for NO. The
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information of the voter ID (“voted” ack) will be sent to EC, and EC will record the status
of the specific voter ID as “voted”; this is the most important information for the database
at EC to prevent double voting during the election. Receipt L will be generated which is
used for the voter to track his/her voting in the final voting tally.

EC
(c[1],c[2]….c[n],t)

Voter registration

Voter
(c[1],c[2],…..c[n],T)

Sending ballot as (C[1],C[2]……C[n], T)
Sending “voted” ack

Sending encrypted voted ballot
((D[1],D[2]…….D[n]), T, L)

Sending tally without candidate list

VCC

Figure 3.5 The block diagram of the voting procedure in NOTE.

The data array D, marker T, and receipt L will be sent to VCC. VCC will use the
key to decrypt the array D, but they do not have the key to decrypt the hidden marker T.
That is, they cannot identify the type of the ballot; the next step is to calculate the vote
tally for each choice with the same type of ballot.
VCC submits the final tally of every type of ballots. After collecting the results of
each type of ballots, the tally of each type of ballots will be published to the voters first.
At this time, the voters still do not know the exact result since the candidates’ names are
still unknown with the encrypted marker T. Then, the EC reveals the marker T on every
ballot, and calculates the final tally of the votes according to the candidate names. In this
case, nobody can change or undermine the result that is published already.
The numeric result of each type of ballot is shown in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1 Voting Result of Each Type of Ballots
Choice 1 Choice 2 Choice 3
A

12

13

4

B

1

12

21

C

7

13

8

D

6

11

4

E

5

10

12

F

10

5

6

After this result is published, the teacher will reveal the exact name ordering as
shown in Table 3.2.
The final election result shows that Alice gets 61 votes, Bob 36 votes, and Charlie
63 votes.
We will describe the mathematical formulation of our proposed method for voters
and candidates’ confidentiality.
Denote c = (c[1], c[2],..., c[n]) as the list of candidates where

is the number of

candidates, and c[i] is a string representing the name of the candidates.
Denote
and

as the marker on the ballot, where

is a set of sequence numbers,

is greater than n! .
Finally, EC generates two sets of data, the ballot identification along with the

corresponding list of candidates. Then, EC encrypts array c and marker
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with different

keys.

Table 3.2 Voting Result of Each Type of Ballots after Revealing the Names of
Candidates

Alice Bob Charlie
A

12

13

4

B

12

1

21

C

13

8

7

D

6

4

11

E

12

5

10

F

6

5

10

Let
, p = qh ,
where w , y , q and h are large numbers.
Let α = ( w − 1)( y − 1) , β = (q − 1)(h − 1)
We will also find r >1 which is coprime to α, and s >1 coprime to β, and choose
r ' and s ' satisfying the following:
(rr ' mod α ) = 1 , ( ss ' mod β ) = 1 ,

where (rr '−1) can be evenly divided by α, and ( ss '−1) can be evenly divided by β.
The data t and c[m] are encrypted by the RSA algorithm as follows:
T = t r mod z
C[m] = c[m]s mod p ,
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where m = 1,2,3,..., n , T and

C[m]

are the encrypted data received at the voter side, and its

private key and public key are all held by EC; the system will automatically filter this
factor and the voter can only read the vote option and cast his/her votes accordingly.
After casting the vote, the system will send the vote ( D [1], D [2],..., D [n], T , L) with
the value of marker

to VCC. D = ( D[1], D[2],..., D[n], T , L) is an array of binary value

generated by the system at the voter side, where “0” means voting NO, and “1” means
voting YES. L is the voter’s verification key to let the voter verify his/her vote in the final
result that whether the vote is counted already.
When VCC receives the array D, it will count the tally of the votes with the same
group of T.
It will be decrypted with
d [m] = D[m]s mod p
'

While VCC does not have the private key of

,

RT = (∑ (d [1], d [2],..., d [n]), T )
= ((∑ d [1], ∑ d [2],..., ∑ d [n]), T )
QT = ((∑ L), T )

Here,

is the tally of the ballot whose marker is T with the same permutation.

∑ (d [1], d [2],..., d [n]) means the sum of each option’s votes. After the counting procedure,
each

with the same group of marker T will be re-transmitted to the public board or

EC; the public will get the tally results while T still remains encrypted. The next step is
to publish the tally result; EC will use the private key of

to decrypt

Then, it will count the final tally by comparing the value of the marker
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.

with the matched

candidate list.

is the database created for the voters’ information, and the voters may

check and verify the cast votes at EC.
When the marker of each type of ballots is clarified and published, the whole tally
summary can be calculated accurately by EC under the public supervision.
As explained, we have addressed the problem exhibited during recent elections in
the past few years. The proposed method ensures voters and candidates’ confidentiality,
safeguarding fair democratic election.
NOTE will prevent problems caused by malfunctions at the E-voting system with
a centralized vote counting authority. It is a novel distributed election model. EC and
VCC are independent of each other to ensure absolute fairness. In past elections, many
contentions happened during the vote counting period, and people always have the
concern on something unknown either in the voting machine or the software. NOTE has
mitigated both of these concerns with decentralized counting procedure to ensure the
absolute independence and voters and candidates’ confidentiality.

3.2 Enhanced Name and Vote Separated E-voting system (E-NOTE)
E-NOTE provides an extra measurement to ensure the accuracy of the vote tallying results
that would prevent VCC from malicious behaviors. Besides the issues addressed in NOTE,
many other issues emerge while the election is held through the Internet.
Voter confidentiality is one of the biggest concerns in elections and many
researchers have explored this issue for a long time. If EC colludes and shares the ballot
distribution information to other authorities, then voter confidentiality may be
compromised. If EC is corrupted, it can form the relationship between a ballot and a
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specific voter who cast the vote. Typical voting model endows the responsibility of the
election authority including registration, vote counting and vote tally. We delegate Ballot
Distribution Center (BDC) to be solely responsible for ballot distribution, which is
necessary to disassociate the link between voter’s identity and his/her distributed ballot.
BDC, VCC, and EC are independent of each other, and our proposed scheme prevents
them from collusion. Besides BDC, we define several distinguished phases more
specifically in the E-voting procedure as follows: voter registration, ballot distribution,
voter casting, ballot collecting, vote counting, vote tally publishing and vote auditing.
Comparing with NOTE, E-NOTE improves two levels of privacy measurements
to reduce the risk of voter privacy leakage, collusion among voting authorities, and
mistaken vote counts. Meanwhile, E-NOTE provides a new platform to ensure a fair Evoting environment to address voter fraud issue. In order to prevent voters from disputing
their votes, we introduce a hardware called watchdog device to record all voting
transactions at voters’ end. The watchdog device is issued by EC when the voter registers
and get verified to vote at EC.
We illustrate E-NOTE scheme with an example of using paper ballots to help
readers understand the concept of the scheme and the different from NOTE. Figure 3.6
shows the flow of information between voters and voting authorities. There are three
election authorities: EC, BDC, and VCC. The responsibility of BDC is separating the
ballot distribution duty from EC. The EC certifies the voter’s eligibility and issues
him/her an electronic certificate, and the voter can obtain the ballot from BDC using EC’s
electronic certificate instead of voters’ identity. Other than the certificate, a voter does
not need to show any identification to BDC and obtains the ballot anonymously. There is
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no linkage between the certificate and the voter’s identity. Hence, this method ensures
voter confidentiality and privacy.

Figure 3.6 The block diagram of the voting procedure in E-NOTE.

The watchdog device records all data transactions carried out during the voting
process (certificate request and issuance, ballot request and issuance, and vote
submission), thereby eliminating the possibility of voter frauds, such as requesting the
ballot or voting more than once.
For example, voter Jessica is one of the voters in a small class to vote; the voting
procedure conducted in E-NOTE for her can be described as follows:
Step 1: Jessica goes to A1 for registration where she receives a certificate card
from A1.
Step 2: Jessica goes to A2 and shows her certification card. Note that Jessica does
not have to show her identity to A2. A2 generates more than 3! types of ballots (since we

29

have 3 candidates), and each ballot has one of these 6 (3! ) permutations and a marker
indicating its type. A2 checks Jessica’s certification card to verify that she is eligible to
vote and that her thumb is not marked (indicating she has not voted, and this is equivalent
to recording the transaction in the watchdog device). When that is confirmed, Jessica
receives the ballot and gets her thumb marked (the mark simply indicates Jessica has
received the ballot and is assumed to remain intact during the whole election). The first
two steps are used to protect voter confidentiality and privacy as there is no linkage
between the certificate and the ballot.
Step 3: The ballot has a carbon copy, and when Jessica marks and submits her
ballot, the carbon copy is retained by her (this is equivalent to recording the transaction
in the watchdog device). The main purpose of this step is to prevent voter frauds. If
Jessica claims there is a problem with her vote, she can use the carbon copy of her ballot
to seek help from authorities for further investigation. In the E-voting mode, the watchdog
device is used to record all the transactions in the voting process.
Step 4: This is similar to the step discussed in NOTE, Jessica tears the ballot into
two parts and casts them into two different boxes. The part containing Jessica’s vote is
given to A3 and the part containing the candidate’s name is given to A1.
Step 5: A3 counts the received ballots once the voting is completed. Since there
are 3! types of ballots and the ballots do not contain the candidates’ names, A3 only tallies
the results based on the ballot type.
Step 6: A3 publishes the tally results of each type of ballots to the public on the
blackboard and passes these results to A1.
Step 7: A1 reveals the candidate’s name for each type of ballots, and the final
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count for each candidate is obtained.
Next, we illustrate the mathematical formulation of E-NOTE. Suppose there are n
voters and w candidates:
Ai: Voter i’s batch code
Bi: Voter i’s date of birth
Ui: Voter i’s identity number
Gi: Voter i’s gender
Di: Voter i’s choice
Ci: Candidate’s name where i is from 1 to n.
M: the certificate given to voters by EC; the voter needs to show this certificate to
BDC to obtain the ballot from BDC.
Let r r’ mod (p-1) = 1 and s s’ mod (p-1) = 1
where p is a large prime number and r is in the range from 1 to (p-1) with gcd(r, p-1) = 1.
We denote r as the private key of EC and r’ as the corresponding decryption key of EC.
Denote s as the private key of voter i, and s is in the range from 1 to (p-1) with gcd(s, p1) = 1. s’ is the corresponding decryption key of voter i.
Step 1: Voter i sends data array (Ui, Gi, Bi, Ai) to EC for registration. After EC’s
verification, EC uses the three-pass encryption algorithm and sends the message:
(E (r, M), F) = ( M r mod p, F )
to Voter i. Before the election, the authorities will initialize every watchdog device with
a set of data. These data are used for securing and monitoring voters’ online voting
behaviors. F is used for the watchdog device to verify that this packet is really from EC,
and E(.,.) is the encryption function. This step shows that EC sends the certificate M to

31

Voter i. If F matches the data stored in the watchdog device which is used for verifying
the packet authenticity, the voting process can proceed. The voter does not have access
to information in the watchdog device; only the authority can review and check the
watchdog device upon request.
Voter i receives the packet from EC, and encrypts it with his/her own private key
s, resulting in the following data:
(E(s, E(r, M)), F) = (E(r, E(s, M)), F)= ( ( M r ) s mod p, F) = ( M rs mod p, F)
This is sent back to EC to decode the packet with its key r’ by the decryption function
Z(.,.).
Z(r’, E(r, (s, M))) = E(s, M) = M s mod p
Denote Φ as the shared key from BDC to EC; Φ is in the range from 1 to p-1 with gcd(v,
p-1) = 1 and v’ is the corresponding decryption key of BDC. Then, EC uses the BDC’s
shared key v to encrypt the certificate again, and the certificate becomes.
sΦ
E(Φ, E(s, M)) = M mod p

Finally, EC sends this certificate to the voter again.
Step 2: Voter i receives and decodes the certificate with his/her key s’ as
Z(s’,

M sΦ mod

Φ
p ) = M mod p = E(Φ, M)

and then sends E(Φ, M) to BDC to show that he/she has the certificate from EC, and it
is encrypted with the key that is only shared between BDC and EC.
BDC uses the same method to decode
Z(Φ’, E(Φ, M)) = M ΦΦ ' mod p = M
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Then, BDC distributes one ballot to Voter i. This protects the voter’s identity.
Step 3: Denote c[i] as the name of the ith candidate and the array c = (c[1], c[2], …,
c[w]) as the packet containing the list of names of all the candidates. Denote t ∈ X as the
marker on the ballot, where X = 1, 2, is a set of sequential numbers, and

X

is greater

than w!.
BDC generates two sets of data, the ballot identification along with the list of
candidates. BDC encrypts the array c and marker

with different keys.

Let
α = (k − 1)(k '−1) , β = ( y − 1)( y '−1)

where z = kk ' , q = yy ' , and k , k ' , y and y ' are large numbers.
We choose 1 < h < α and 1 < v < β such that

and gcd(v, β ) = 1 . h' and v'

are chosen so that they satisfy the following:
(hh' mod α ) = 1 and (vv' mod β ) = 1 ,

where h’ and v’ are the multiplicative inverse of h mod α and v mod β , respectively.
The marker t and the array c are encrypted as follows:

T = t h mod α
C[i ] = (c[i ]) v mod β

where i = 1,2,..., w , T and

are the encrypted data received at the voter side with

different keys, h and v, respectively. BDC holds both the private key exponent h’ and the
public key exponent h, i.e., VCC cannot decrypt the marker T.
Step 4: After the voter submits the vote, the system sends the vote packet
( D [1], D [2],..., D [ w], T , L)

with the value of marker
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to VCC. The array D is encrypted

with the public key exponent v. It is a binary array generated by the system at the voter
side and can be decrypted at the VCC side with the VCC’s private key v’. L is the voter’s
voting receipt to let the voter verify his/her vote to ensure that the vote is counted
properly.
Step 5: VCC receives and decrypts the array D, and then the votes are tallied for
each type of ballot based on T. The array D is decrypted as follows:
d [i ] = D[i ]v ' mod β
where i is from 1 to w.
While VCC does not have the private key h’,
TALLYT = (∑ (d [1], d [2],..., d [ w]), T )

= ((∑ d [1], ∑ d [2],..., ∑ d [ w]), T )

VERT = ((∑ L), T )
Here,

TALLYT

is the tally of the ballots with the same marker T.

∑ (d [1], d [2],..., d [w])

represents the sum of the votes for every candidate, i.e.,
(∑ d [1], ∑ d [2],..., ∑ d [ w])

where ∑ d [ j ] represents the number of votes casted for candidate j. For example, if there
are three types of ballots with the sequences of candidates “Alice, Bob, Charlie”, “Alice,
Charlie, Bob” and “Charlie, Alice, Bob”. VCC will summarize the result of each
individual type of ballots with the same sequence which is marked by T.

∑ d[1], ∑ d[2],..., ∑ d[w] shows the number of votes that each candidate receives for one type
of ballot.

VERT

will be stored in a database used for the voting receipt storage. It allows

voters to visit and track the votes they have voted.
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Step 6: After VCC finishes counting the votes, each TALLYT with the same
marker T is published to the public and transmitted to EC.
Step 7: EC uses the private key to decrypt t = T h ' mod α and tallies the final
results.
When the content of the marker for each ballot type is reviewed and published,
the final votes can be tallied accurately by EC under the public’s scrutiny.
Since E-NOTE is set up to prevent VCC or other possible hackers from changing
the vote results. Consider an example that the malicious authorities/hackers are trying to
subvert or change the election voting results under the table.
We define x as the event that the malicious authority or the hacker guessed the
location of their favorite candidate on the ballot correctly. Define P(x) as the probability
that this can be done. If there are w candidates, then there are w outcomes for this event
and P(x) is 1/w.
We define y as the event that the malicious authority or the hacker guessed the
sequence of candidates on the ballot correctly. Define P(y) as the probability that this can
be done and there are w! types of the ballot, and therefore
1

The entropy of X and Y,

𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦) = 𝑤𝑤!
𝐻𝐻(𝑋𝑋) = − ∑𝑤𝑤 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) log 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)
𝐻𝐻(𝑌𝑌) = − ∑𝑤𝑤! 𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦) log 𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦)

Using the definition in information theory, we know that the mutual information
relationship is as follows:
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𝐼𝐼(𝑋𝑋, 𝑌𝑌) = 𝐻𝐻(𝑌𝑌) − 𝐻𝐻(𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋)

𝐼𝐼(𝑋𝑋, 𝑌𝑌) = 𝐻𝐻(𝑋𝑋) − 𝐻𝐻(𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌)

From our definition and assumption, if the permutation of the list of candidates on
the ballot is guessed successfully by VCC or other hackers, then VCC’s favorite
candidate’s position on the ballot will be known. The conditional entropy is:
H(X|Y) =0
This conditional entropy is 0 since the order of the candidates on the ballot is
already known.
From the relationship between the mutual information and conditional entropy:
I(X,Y)=H(X)-H(X|Y)
I(X,Y)=H(Y)-H(Y|X)
Since H(X|Y)=0,
H(Y)-H(Y|X)=H(X)
H(Y|X)=H(Y)-H(X)
From above, we have:
𝐻𝐻(𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋) = 𝐻𝐻(𝑌𝑌) − 𝐻𝐻(𝑋𝑋)
= − � 𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦) log 𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦) − �− � 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) log 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)�
𝑤𝑤!

1

𝑤𝑤

1

1

1

= 𝑤𝑤 ∗ 𝑤𝑤 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑤𝑤 − 𝑤𝑤! ∗ 𝑤𝑤! 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑤𝑤!
1

1

=𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑤𝑤 − log 𝑤𝑤! = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 (𝑤𝑤 − 1)!

Figure 3.7 shows the relationship between the number of candidates and the
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conditional entropy. The conditional entropy can be interpreted as how likely the
malicious authority VCC or the hackers can guess the permutation of the candidates set
on the ballot if the position of their favorite candidate on the ballot is known. The number
of candidates varies from 2 to 50 in Figure 3.7 and a larger value in the conditional entropy
indicates there is more uncertainty in determining the permutation of the candidates on
the ballot.
Consider the special case when there are only 2 candidates running in the election,
i.e., w=2. When VCC or the hackers guessed the position of their favorite candidate
successfully on one ballot, the position of the other candidate on the ballot is also known.
This means that the conditional entropy H(Y|X)=0 as shown in Figure 3.7.
In large-scale elections where there are a large number of ballots, we can consider
the probability of picking any ballot type as being equal. If we have ƞ types of the ballot,
the probability of any specific type ballot being selected is 1/ ƞ.

Figure 3.7 The relationship between the number
of candidates and the conditional entropy.

37

Consider the case that the malicious authority VCC or the hacker guessed their
favorite candidate on one of the ballots successfully. When the malicious authority or the
hacker obtains the next ballot, the event 𝜏𝜏 is defined as the successful guess on the next
ballot and the probability P(τ) of guessing successfully the same candidate is:
𝑃𝑃(𝜏𝜏) =
=

1
1
1
∗ 1 + �1 − � ∗
𝑤𝑤!
𝑤𝑤! 𝑤𝑤

1
𝑤𝑤! − 1
1
+�
�∗
𝑤𝑤!
𝑤𝑤!
𝑤𝑤
=

𝑤𝑤 + 𝑤𝑤! − 1
𝑤𝑤! ∗ 𝑤𝑤

A plot of Equation above is shown in Figure 3.8. The values of P(τ) for selected
values of w are tabulated as Table 3.3.
In the worst case scenario where the cryptography method has been hacked by the
malicious authority or the hacker, our E-NOTE scheme can still protect the candidate’s
privacy. P(τ) will drop from 1 to 0.04 if there are 25 candidates in the election.
Besides the candidates for the presidency, a national election ballot will have
candidates of senators, governors and local officers. The total number of choices in a
ballot can be around 25 and we can add another 25 more “virtual candidates” in the actual
communication packet to decrease the probability of being guessed to 0.02. Voters will
not see the “virtual candidate” while they vote and this will enhance the security in the
election.
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Table 3.3 Comparison Table on Different w Affecting to the Probability P(τ)
W

P(τ)

5

0.26
0.10

10

0.05

20

0.04

25

0.03

30

0.02

50

Figure 3.8 The relationship between P(τ) and w.
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3.3 Three-pass Based Enhanced Name and Vote Separated E-voting System
The three-pass algorithm is a kind of encryption used for two parties’ communication. In
the voter registration phase, EC receives the registration request from the voter; EC
verifies and determines whether the voter is eligible to receive the certificate. EC uses a
three-pass cryptographic algorithm to encrypt the certificate and sends it to the voter. The
voter uses a three-pass cryptographic algorithm to encrypt the certificate with his/her own
key. Then, the voter sends the encrypted certificate (which is encrypted twice with
different keys from EC and the voter) back to EC. When EC receives the encrypted
certificate from the voter, EC decodes it with the voter’s own key and then applies the
BDC’s key (which is only shared by EC and BDC) on the encrypted certificate, and sends
it back to the voter again. The voter receives the certificate and uses her own key to
decode the encrypted message. After this step, the certificate is only encrypted by the
BDC’s key. The voter sends the encrypted certificate which is only encrypted with the
BDC’s key to BDC. BDC uses its private key to decode the certificate and verify the
certificate is from EC. If the verification is positive, the voter is eligible to receive a ballot.
This procedure could well protect voters’ identity from being leaked if the voting
authority is malicious.

Figure 3.9 The block diagram of the ballot distributing process in three-pass
cryptography based E-voting system.
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3.4 Ring Signature Based Enhanced Name and Vote Separated
E-voting System (RE-NOTE)
The ring signature algorithm is designed to allow a group member to sign a message
anonymously among the whole group. There are several possible signers and one actual
signer to form a valid ring signature. The actual signer is the member who signed the
signature in the whole group, the possible signer is the member who did not sign the
signature but belongs to this specific group with the actual signer. Although the actual
signer is anonymous, he/she still can be identically recognized to this certain group.
According to the definition of the ring signature, the verification function must be a one
to one collision-free mapping function. In the ballot distribution phase in RE-NOTE, we
set a group of voters to create a ring signature.
We need to emphasize that the ring signature scheme is similar to the group
signature scheme except that the former one has no group manager. The advantage of the
ring signature is that no centralized controller is involved in the signature. If we
incorporate a group manager to form a signature in the scheme, there will be another
potential concern about trustworthiness since we consider the reality that the election
authorities are not fully trustable. Ring signature is pretty well suitable for our work RENOTE during the ballot distribution phase since it can provision voters’ anonymity and
overcome the complicated situation when there is a corrupted or malicious authority
involved in the whole voting procedure during the election.
An E-voting scheme not equipped with the ring signature may result in the
following attack scenario: Voter Jack is being verified at EC and is going to BDC to get
a ballot. If BDC is malicious and Jack does not make himself anonymous, BDC could
track Jack’s assigned ballot and get to know the content of Jack’s vote. This obviously
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ruins the privacy and confidentiality policy of any political election. By applying ring
signature, it is more secure for voter Jack to show his eligibility rather than his identity to
request a plain ballot from BDC.
The Ring signature scheme is designed to allow a group of members to sign
messages while remaining anonymous among the whole group. For the ballot distribution
procedure in RE-NOTE, the following assumptions are made:
Suppose we have l members in a group to create the ring signature. Permutation
on each input: for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ l, for any fixed and distinct value of all the inputs 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ,

the verification function 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 (), and the value rv is one to one mapping plus collision-free

from the input 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 to the output 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 which means we will get a unique output with each

different input. Neither voting authorities nor voters are fully trustable. This model can
prevent authorities’ fraud from among them, including the clash attack, and it has other
advanced features such as voter identity recognition. The ring signature and RSA are the
main cryptographic methods used in RE-NOTE.
The basic operation procedure of the ring signature scheme is described below:
There are l members forming a group to perform a ring signature. Each member
of the group has a pair of keys, public key (Pki) and private key (Ski): (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1 , 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 ),

(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2 , 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆2 ),…. (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 , 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙 ). A group member 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 , can create a signature rv by using the ring

signature cryptography. Under the definition of ring signature, anyone may check the

validity of a ring signature by using the signature rv, the message m, and the public keys
involved 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1 , 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2 , … , 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 .

Here we need to clarify the notion of the actual signer and the possible signer.

The actual signer is a signer of the signature on a message m, and the possible signers are
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a set of members in the ring group who may sign the signature. Each signature will be
signed by one actual signer only, and this actual signer belongs to a group of several
possible signers.
Denote the group with l members to form a ring signature scheme. Each group
member 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 has the public key 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 to form a function f (.). Since each member 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 has
its own private key 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , this member is the only one who knows how to get the reverse

function: 𝑓𝑓 −1 (. )

1) Generating a group signature:
The actual signer: member 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 is given the message m and a set of public keys

from the other members in the group: 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1 , 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2 , … . 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 .

𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 picks a random value rv, uniformly-distributed in {0,1}, also randomly picks

𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 as a generator for all the other ring members 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 (1≤i≤l, i≠s), then computes:
yi = f ( xi )

Since there is a unique value 𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠 that satisfied the equation 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 (𝑦𝑦1, , 𝑦𝑦2 , 𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠 , … , 𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙 ) =

rv, where 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 () is the function used for the verification step. rv is the initialization value
since we already know 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 (1≤i≤l, i≠s).

Once 𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠 is calculated and found, an actual signer 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 can compute:
xs = f

−1

( ys )

2) Form the ring signature:
The ring signature will be signed with the format below:
(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1 , 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2 , … . 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 , rv , 𝑥𝑥1 , 𝑥𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠 … . 𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙 , 𝑚𝑚)

3) Check the signature:

Any verifier can verify an alleged signature on the message as follows:
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Apply the function f (.). to compute y i = f ( xi ) for each i=1,2,…l,:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 (𝑦𝑦1, , 𝑦𝑦2 , 𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠 , … , 𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙 ) = rv

If the equation above is satisfied, the verifier accepts the signature as valid.
During the ballot distribution phase, we assume there is a group of several voters
creating the ring signature, according to the definition of the ring signature, the
verification function ψ(.) which is used for verification purpose is a one to one mapping
with collision-free function.
We focus on one of the basic foundations of a fair election which is to maintained
voters confidentiality and anonymity. In the past years, many researchers have explored
this topic on different levels. The goal of our research is to setup an E-voting model for
the future. The voter’s confidentiality and vote verification are two of the most important
issues and challenges in elections. If EC and BDC collude and share the ballot distribution
information, then voter’s confidentiality can be compromised. If the EC is corrupted, the
relationship between voters and a specific ballot for each voter can be rebuilt and linked.
At the final step during the election, if the authority made the faked or duplicated receipt
to different voters, the clash attack could be applied successfully.
We will adopt ring signature’s basic property and clash attack solution to achieve
a better explanation to readers on our scheme RE-NOTE.

Figure 3.10 shows the

information flow between voters and voting authorities in the election. We still have three
election authorities: EC, BDC, and VCC. Eligible voters will be divided into several
groups to reduce the possible ring signature size and improve the calculation efficiency.
After certifying the voter’s eligibility, EC issues this voter a key of EC that is only shared
among BDC and all other eligible voters to form the ring signature. Every voter will
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choose a random number to sign a ring signature to keep himself anonymous by showing
the signature. Once BDC verifies that the signature is valid, they will acknowledge that
this voter is eligible to get a new plain ballot. Apart from the ring signature, each voter
does not need to show any identification to the authority (BDC) and there is no linkage
between the signature and voter’s identity either. Therefore, this ring signature method
definitely ensures voters confidentiality and privacy at the ballot distribution step.

Figure 3.10 Flow diagram of how voters interact with election authorities.

Watchdog devices are also used for securing and monitoring the online voting
behaviors at voter side. We still need to implement the special device (watchdog) to
provide a reliable voter-reorganization through the Internet in RE-NOTE as an enhanced
model.
We will discuss the ring signature based ballot distributing function along with
clash attack prevention as below.
Step 1: EC will check each voter’s eligibility. Once this voter is verified, EC will
assign the key KEC and the certificate M to him. This shared key KEC will be only
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transferred from BDC to those voters who passed the registration verification. And this
key can be set to different value among a large number of groups. The voter uses the ring
signature algorithm to encrypt the certificate with his/her own random pick. Then, the
voter can request the ballot from BDC by sending the ring signature.
Step 2: When BDC receives the ring signature from the voter, BDC checks the
ring signature to verify whether it comes from the authority EC since the signature must
contain the key KEC and the certificate M from EC. If the ring signature passes the check
by BDC, it means this voter is eligible to obtain a plain ballot. In the meantime, voter’s
identity is hidden and protected.
Step 3: The voter receives the ballot from BDC. The flag in the watchdog will be
set to record this action to prevent the possible second ballot requesting or receiving
action.
Step 4: The ballot mode and vote casting have been described in E-NOTE. We
will continue with the solution to prevent clash attack on vote verification step.
Step 5: The voter casts the vote along with a random number chosen by
herself/himself to VCC, and a receipt with tracking number will be generated with this
random number and sent back to the voter. The voter can use this tracking number to
review and track his/her vote, and this action will be also recorded in the watchdog at the
voter side.
Step 6: While VCC collects all the data required for vote counting, VCC uses its
own key to decrypt votes, and the marker still remains unknown since VCC does not have
the key to decode. This step ensures that all types of ballots remain anonymous to VCC.
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Step 7: VCC tabulates and publishes the results for each type of ballots and then
sends them to EC. The candidate’s name is still unknown to VCC because of the
encrypted marker.
Step 8: BDC publishes the private key on the bulletin before EC reveals the value
of marker on all ballots, and calculates the final tally of the votes according to the
candidate names. Since those steps are open to the public during the vote counting,
authority will have no opportunity to manipulate the voting tally in the public domain.
Step 9: Every voter can check his own vote with the vote tracking number. If the
authority manipulates the process by giving the same receipt/tracking number to different
voters, described as the clash attack above, voters will get the votes associated with a
random number. Since this random number was picked personally by the specific voter,
it is easy to detect the clash attack from voters if the attack has been applied.
Our proposed process is a method to protect voter’s privacy better as well as offer
a better way for voters to verify their own votes. Once the authority BDC receives the
ballot request from the anonymous voter, they still cannot locate or track the voter’s
identity even if the ring signature is checked correctly. As described above, we have
reduced communication steps from either BDC or EC to voters through the Internet,
versus those steps described in E-NOTE. The voting authorities, EC, BDC and VCC, are
independent of each other to ensure absolute fairness during the election. Our revised Evoting scheme RE-NOTE can mitigate both of these concerns by utilizing a decentralized
counting process thus can better protect voter confidentiality.
Next, the same ballot distribution procedure will be calculated by ring signature
in mathematic form.
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We will illustrate the mathematical formula of our proposed method. Suppose l
voters form a voting group and there are w candidates:
As: Voter s batch code or group number
Bs: Voter s basic information including date of birth, identity number and gender,
etc.
Ds: Voter s choice
Cs: Candidate’s name where s is from 1 to n.
KEC: EC’s key required for eligible voters to form a ring signature
REC: EC’s private key in the group
M: the certificate given to voters by EC; the voter needs to show M with the ring
signature to BDC to obtain the plain ballot from BDC.
Suppose we have a simple case where there is only one group of voters. In reality,
all voters will be divided into several groups or batches based on the voters’ registration
county or state. According to the method discussed above, we denote (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) to be a

pair of the public and private key of each ring group member except EC in the group, and
(KEC, REC) to be the public and private key of EC. The public key KEC may be different

in the different groups, and it is only shared between BDC and those voters who have
negotiated with EC. We denote voter s as one of the group members.
Step 1: Voter s sends data array (Bs, As) to EC for registration. EC will not
distribute the certificate M and the key KEC to voter s until voter s passes EC’s voter
registration check.
Step 2: After voter s gets the certificate M and key KEC from EC, voter s will have
all public keys of each group member (𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1 , 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2 , … 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 ),
Let
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Ɵ=(𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1 , 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2 , … 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 )

be the list of public keys. Voter s calculates the signature by using some
independent cryptographic hash functions:
𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 =Hash (Ɵ)

Pick the random value 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 from {0,1} and calculate every 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 with the equation:

yi = f ( xi )

(1≤i≤l, i≠s,)

y KEC = f ( x KEC )
𝑓𝑓( )and 𝑓𝑓 −1 ( ) are a pair of function and its reverse function. After voter s

calculates all 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 required to form a ring signature, voter s will get the specific 𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠 as below:

Then computes:

C𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 ( 𝑦𝑦𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾, 𝑦𝑦1, , 𝑦𝑦2 , … 𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠 , … … 𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙 , 𝑀𝑀, 𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 ) = 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠
xs = f

−1

( ys )

C𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 () is considered as the signature verification function.

Finally, the ring signature is generated as:

(Ɵ , 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 , 𝑀𝑀, 𝑥𝑥𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾, 𝑥𝑥1 , 𝑥𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠 . 𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙 )

Step 3: After BDC receives this ring signature

using:

(Ɵ , 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 , 𝑀𝑀, 𝑥𝑥𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾, 𝑥𝑥1 , 𝑥𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠 . 𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙 ) from the voter, BDC will verify the value by
C𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 ( 𝑦𝑦𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾, 𝑦𝑦1, , 𝑦𝑦2 , … 𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠 , … … 𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙 , 𝑀𝑀, 𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 ) = 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠

Obviously, this ring signature contains EC’s key information and the certificate
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M. If this signature passes the check, it does mean that the voter is eligible since EC only
distributes its own information above to the eligible voters.
Step 4: Voter s is eligible to receive the plain ballot from BDC. The ballot format
can be described as: Denote c[i] to be the name of the ith candidate and array c = (c[1],
c[2], …, c[w]) to be the packet containing the list of names of the candidates in the
election.
BDC generates two sets of data for each eligible voter which is the ballot marker
along with the list of candidates. BDC encrypts the marker

with the key that is known

to BDC only.
We have

α = (k − 1)(k '−1) ,
where z = kk ' , k and k ' are large numbers.
We select 1<h<α such that gcd(ℎ, 𝛼𝛼) = 1 . h' and h are chosen so that they satisfy

the following:

(hh' mod α ) = 1
and h’ is the multiplicative inverse of h mod α respectively.
The marker t are encrypted as follows:

T = t h mod α
BDC holds both h’ and h, i.e., VCC does not have the key for decrypting the
marker T in the packet.
Step 5: When the voter casts the vote, they will send the voting data
(d [1], d [2],..., d [ w], T , zs )

with the marker

to VCC. The binary array d represents the choice
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of voter s. zs is the random number that enables voters to verify his votes.
Step 6: VCC receives array d from all voters, and the votes are tallied for each
type of marker T. Then VCC generates unique confirmation number with each

zs

and

array d that will be used for voters’ verification step. The confirmation vers will be sent
back to voter s.
While VCC can gather all information as below:
TALLYT = (∑ (d [1]i , d [2]i ,..., d [ w]i ), T )
= ((∑ d [1]i , ∑ d [2]i ,..., ∑ d [ w]i ), T )

DatabaseT = ((∑ zi ), T )

Here,

is the temporary tally result for the ballots with the same marker T.

TALLYT

∑ (d [1] , d [2] ,..., d [w] )
i

i

i

represents the sum of the votes for every candidate, i.e.,

∑ d[ j]

i

represents the number of votes received by candidate j. veri will be stored in a database
for voting receipts. It allows voters to track and verify the votes they cast.
Step 7: After VCC finishes counting procedure, each

TALLYT

with the same

marker T is unveiled to all voters and transmitted to EC. At the same time, BDC will
unveil the private key to all the voters, EC uses its own key to decrypt the marker as
t = T h ' mod α then tallies the final results.

Step 8: Voter s can make an inquiry whether his voter has been counted correctly
and verify his own vote in the final tally. He sends his vote tracking confirmation

vers

to

the authority. Since voter s is anonymous as we describe above, the authority will not
discover the exact checker, but have to provide the votes along with the random number
z s that

was picked up by this specific voter.
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We need to emphasize that our proposed model RE-NOTE is based on the ring
signature in ballot distribution process for voters to exchange the required information
with authorities during the election. Comparing with the three-pass algorithm, we have
following important advantages:
Simplifying the communication step: In E-NOTE, there are several steps between
voters and EC or BDC through the Internet to locate the voters; in RE-NOTE, there is
only one communication step between voters and each authority to identify the eligible
voters. It will be beneficial for future network resource to adopt the large scale election
through the Internet media.
Refining the size of voter groups: Since we use the ring signature to setup one part
of election procedure, voters are required to be divided into different groups or batches,
the communication packets will be fixed due to the fixed size of the ring signature. This
would make it easier for authorities to manage the voters in a large scale. Since every
county and every state have different candidates in different race, it is easier to divide
millions of voters into smaller voting group to make the algorithm applicable.
Due to the fact that more communication steps are required for the three-pass
algorithm in E-NOTE, using ring signature may reduce the communication steps between
voters and the authorities during the ballot distribution procedure. Our new proposed
scheme RE-NOTE will provide a better encryption scheme to ensure a real protection for
ballot distributing that would prevent the authorities such as BDC, EC from conducting
malicious activities.
Most voting election has the privacy requirement that there should be no
association between the cast vote and the voters’ identity. RE-NOTE goes further beyond

52

by disassociating the relationship between the voters and assigned ballots as well. Our
other implemented methods such as the watchdog device can also be transplanted to RENOTE to build an E-voting model so that reliable and authentic voters can communicate
with the authorities. If there are any voting disputes claimed by voters, it will be a good
recorder for authority’s further investigation.
The novelty of RE-NOTE is to create several groups to setup the mutual restrictive
relationship between the voters and the voting authorities. The ring signature will secure
the anonymity of the voters to the authorities. The outlined scheme also eliminates voter
anonymity leakage and protects both voters’ and candidates’ confidentiality and privacy.
The application of the ring signature scheme will increase the security and cryptography
level on the voters’ confidentiality and anonymity. If the number of the voters is large
enough, the possibility for hackers to decode the message encrypted by ring signature will
be greatly reduced.
We have illustrated the enhanced E-voting system, RE-NOTE, which protects
the voters’ anonymity. In addition, we have developed the framework and hardware
method that can better protect voter confidentiality and keep voter anonymous.

3.5 Multi-part Ballot Based Name and Vote Separated E-voting System (M-NOTE)
Since our assumption is based on a no-fully trusted authority, it is important to consider
the possible clash attack issue and find a solution in our proposed system. Consider the
following scenarios:
Malicious authorities provide fake or duplicate receipts to different voters and
then instigate the clash attack successfully.
A hacker obtains a portion of a ballot and finds out what the voter actually voted.

53

A hacker reconstructs a valid original ballot by collecting all portions that were
assigned to a specific voter.
If any of the above ever happens, the relationship between voters and their votes
can be exposed, and the anonymity aspect of the E-voting system will be compromised.
A multi-part ballot is defined as a kind of ballot containing several separable parts.
Each candidate is listed in a permutation from CAN-1 to CAN-β on the ballot. Each
separable single-part only contains one vote for one candidate out of all the candidates.
The choice on the single-part could be “yes” or “no”, and every single-part of the multipart ballot contains a unique sequence number (as shown in Figure 3.11 as the blackened
area). Every single-part (see Figure 3.12) contains one choice of a specific candidate no
matter the vote is “yes or no” on it. All of the single-part ballots will be cast to VCC and
counted independently. Since we have β candidates in the election, the number of singleparts is set to β.
Since a multi-part ballot contains β single-parts, where each single-part has a type
marker because the total number of ballot type is φ (1≤ φ ≤ β!), a sequence number Se (1≤
Se ≤ β), and a checkbox is defined to indicate whether this candidate is voted or not. Our
multi-part ballot design will add an extra security level to protect candidate’s identity and
the vote information from being hacked as compared with the scheme containing the
integrated ballot information of a voter’s vote in the election. Figure 3.12 illustrates a
sample of this multi-part ballot scheme with β equal to 3. After the voter casts his/her
ballot, it will be counted in a more secure way by disassociating candidates’ identities
with the corresponding permutation on an assigned ballot.
Instead of attacking the robust E-voting system, hackers may try to intercept the
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voting data through the Internet. We need to reduce the voting data transmitted to a
minimal so that the proposed E-voting scheme can be maximally protected and secure the
whole E-voting procedure.

Figure 3.11 A sample of a plain multi-part ballot for a three candidates’ race.

The operation procedure of M-NOTE can be described as follows:
EC verifies every voter’s identity. Once a voter is verified, EC will authorize this
voter’s voting privilege and a ballot will be distributed to him/her by BDC. The detailed
ballot distribution procedure is described in, in which we also describe how the voters’
anonymity is well protected during the ballot distribution phase by using ring signature.
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Figure 3.12 Single-part portions which show three candidates race with the
marked ones on the top.

The voter receives a ballot from BDC and its format is shown in Figure 3.11.
As described in our previous works, a watchdog device is used to record and
monitor the entire online voting transactions. Only the voting authorities have access to
the data stored in the watchdog device. The ballot distribution transactions will be
recorded in the watchdog device to avoid any multiple or duplicated ballots.
After making his/her choices on the ballot, the voter separates the ballot into parts
(as shown in Figure 3.12) and casts them to VCC along with the set of trackers.
The voter can use these trackers to review and track his/her vote anonymously in
the final tally. The whole procedure is also recorded in the watchdog device. This will
prevent the receipt-based clash attack during the vote verification and ballot
reconstruction phases.
If a voter wants to verify his/her vote, the voting authorities must show him/her
the corresponding trackers that have been recorded from the multi-part ballot. These
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trackers must match with the ones the voter has recorded earlier. This procedure ensures
that each vote will be counted without being compromised in the final tally. Figure 3.13
shows the procedural flow of M-NOTE.

Figure 3.13 The block diagram of a voter interaction
with election authorities by using a multi-part ballot.

Since the voter’s identity is anonymous during the ballot distribution phase, the
tracker chosen by the voter cannot be linked back to his/her identity. Note that each
tracker chosen by the voter comes from a single database and it is unique for all voters
during the election. In the vote verification step, if a voter makes an inquiry in the final
tally, the authority cannot respond with a manipulated vote since the inquirer’s identity is
not known to the authorities. In the situation that the malicious authority instigates the
clash attack to manipulate the vote count by generating exactly the same receipt/tracking
number to different voters, it will be quite easy for the voters to detect the attack as well,
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for the same reason that the authority cannot identify each voter and respond with a
matched tracker.
We illustrate the mathematical formulation in our scheme M-NOTE by
assuming there are M voters participating in the election with N candidates:
Ai: Voter i’s group number;
Bi: Voter i’s basic identification and other information;
di[j]: Voter i’s choice (either 0 or 1), where j is from 1 to N. To improve the
security level, every type of ballots may have the reversed definition of the choice. For
example, type 1 may define 0 for voting “yes” and 1 for voting “no” while type 2 may
do the opposite, 0 for voting “no” and 1 for voting “yes”.
Step 1: Voter i sends data array (Bi, Ai) to EC for registration. The voter will get
a ballot from BDC after passing the voter registration check by EC.
Step 2: When voter i casts the vote, the voting data
(𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 [1], 𝑆𝑆[1], 𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 , 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[1] ), (𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 [2], 𝑆𝑆[2], 𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 , 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[2] ), ..., (𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 [𝑁𝑁], 𝑆𝑆[𝑁𝑁], 𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 , 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑁𝑁] )

will be sent to VCC. The binary array 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 represents the encrypted choices of 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 and 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗]

(1<j<N) is a set of unique random numbers used as trackers that were initially generated
by the authorities and could be modified by voters. This set of tracker numbers will enable
the voter to verify and audit his/her vote. S[j] (1<j<N) is the sequence number of a singlepart ballot. 𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 (1<x<N!) is the encrypted marker used to represent the ballot type.
Step 3: Voter i will save all 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗] as the receipt of casting the vote.

Step 4: VCC receives the array 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 from all voters, and these votes will be

grouped according to the marker 𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 . Then, VCC uses its private key to decrypt the entire
encoded data array 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 to count the votes.
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While VCC tallies the votes:
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 = ((� 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 [1], � 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 [2], … , � 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 [𝑁𝑁] , (𝑧𝑧1[1] , . . . , 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗] ), 𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 )

At this time, the trackers will be stored separately along with the votes for each
candidate in the election database as below:
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶1 = �𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗] , (𝐶𝐶1 )𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗] �

……..𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 = �𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗] , (𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 )𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗] �

Here, (𝐶𝐶1 𝐶𝐶2 ….𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 ) is the set of candidates. 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶1 stores the data related to

every vote and tracker for candidate 𝐶𝐶1 . 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗] represents the collection of the trackers for

every candidate, i.e., (𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 )𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗] (1≤ j ≤N) is the final tally for candidate 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 accordingly with
all votes. Each unique tracker is the key for voters to retrieve and locate their own votes
anonymously.
Step 5: Voter i can make an inquiry to verify whether his/her votes have been
counted correctly by checking the corresponding 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗] in the candidate’s database. Since

voter i is anonymous, the authority will not be able to discover the identity of the actual

inquirer but has to provide the votes along with the tracker 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗] that was selected earlier

(in Step 2) by this specific voter.

3.6 Time-lock and Timed-release Scheme
To prevent manipulation and alteration from malicious authorities such as EC in the final
tally, we introduce the time-lock and timed-release protocol that will be used to secure
the manifest of candidate orders on each specific ballot type during the whole election
(May, 1993). The basic idea of the time-lock and timed-release crypto is to encrypt a
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message and then decode it in a future time point in order to lock this important message
for a certain period of time. In the new proposed model, the order of candidates on each
type of ballot will be securely locked (unable to be decoded and changed) for a certain
time. Normally we set this certain period to be the whole duration of the corresponding
election. Once election ends, there is no need to hide the manifest of the ballot type.
Hence, this time-lock could be used to restrict some other unauthorized access on the
manifest in terms of time. The term “manifest” refers to a document, which provides
comprehensive details of the ballot type and candidate sequence associated with each
ballot type design in the election. Meanwhile, we will enhance and extend the existing
framework of our research work by introducing a new method that can further restrict any
malicious authority’s activities
Suppose we have a political election with two candidates as shown in Table 3.4.
There are two permutations of candidates, and therefore we have two types of ballots.
After all ballots are collected and VCC begins to count votes, the voting result is
published without releasing any candidate’s identity or the permutations in Table 3.5. As
compared with the type of ballot shown in Table 3.4, we can obtain the final voting result
as shown in Table 3.6. Alice wins the election by receiving 35 votes vs Bob’s 5 votes.
If Bob is the desired winner by the malicious authority EC, EC could alter the
manifest of permutations to temper the voting results. Table 3.4 could be altered to the
one shown in Table 3.7 and the manipulated voting results would be as shown in Table
3.8. Obviously, with the manipulated permutation, Bob eventually wins the election. This
is a kind of attack we need to defend by applying the time-lock and timed-release scheme.
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Table 3.4 Example of Two Type of Ballot with Different Candidate Permutations
Ballot Type A

Ballot Type B

Alice

Bob

Bob

Alice

Table 3.5 Voting Results without Releasing the Actual Candidate Permutation Info
Ballot Type A

Ballot Type B

Choice 1: 12

Choice 1: 4

Choice 2: 1

Choice 2: 23

Table 3.6 Authenticated Voting Results According to the Released Candidate
Permutation
Ballot Type A

Ballot Type B

Alice : 12

Bob : 4

Bob : 1

Alice : 23

Table 3.7 Manipulated Permutations at Malicious Authority’s Favor
Ballot Type A

Ballot Type B

Bob

Alice

Alice

Bob
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Table 3.8 Tampered Voting Results with Manipulated Candidate Permutation
Ballot Type A

Ballot Type B

Bob : 12

Alice : 4

Alice : 1

Bob : 23

3.7 Voter Jury
The time-lock and timed-release protocol employs a trusted agent to operate the timelock scheme and to release the time-lock after a certain time, which is called “time puzzle”.
In our research work, the original “trusted agent” defined in the time-lock and timedrelease protocol will be replaced with a voter jury composed of a group of voters to
supervise the time-lock. Similar to jury members in the court, every voter can be
randomly chosen to be the voter jury member or pre-registered prior to the election to
conduct the legal exercise. All jury members’ identities can be published to the public. It
is a basic requirement to incorporate the time-lock and timed-release scheme into our Evoting system model.
Since we apply time-lock and timed-release mechanism into our E-voting system
model, we need a decentralized trusted agent instead of a single trusted agent to generate
the time-lock and timed-release puzzle. It is more favorable to have more than one trusted
agent to form a shared key by voter jury members to operate the time puzzle to ensure the
fairness of this phase. As described in Section 3.6, the time-lock and timed-release
mechanism is suitable to deter this type of attacks. It takes a certain time T for anyone to
compute the encrypted message without knowing the key. We normally set the certain
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time T to be the length of the election duration. So even if the manifest of the list of
permutations is hacked after computing for a certain time, the election has ended. Then,
the manifest of candidate permutations on each ballot type is regularized and any
modification during the election is impossible.
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CHAPTER 4
VOTING PROTOCOL WITH ANTI-ATTACK SOLUTIONS

The main features of our voting protocol include:
(1) voter anonymity throughout the process (after registration),
(2) vote verification in the final tally, and
(3) safe guard against malicious authorities from manipulating received votes.
The voting protocol consists of the following steps:
(1) The voter’s eligibility is verified at EC and is assigned a digital certificate from
EC.
(2) The voter requests ballot anonymously from BDC using the certificate.
(3) BDC verifies the voter eligibility and assigns a multi-part ballot (one of the
several types).
(4) The voter designates tracking number on the vote and cast the vote to VCC.
(5) VCC counts ballots based on ballot types and releases the voting summary to
the public.
(6) The ballot type manifest is released and the final result is tallied.
(7) The voter can anonymously inquire their vote with the confirmation number.
Figure 4.1 illustrates our E-voting system model, referred to time-lock algorithm
based E-voting system with Ring signature and Multi-part form (TERM). The voting
process and the various system functionalities will be explained through a voter (Tom)
voting in the paper ballot mode so that the process can be easily understood.
We give an example that a voter, Tom, participates in the election, and the voting
procedure will be introduced as below.
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Figure 4.1 The whole voting procedure for a voter to send own ballot to VCC and tracking own vote by using the confirmation to
inquire.
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4.1 Registration
First, voter Tom will verify his voting eligibility with the election authority EC prior to the
election. This is similar to the traditional voter registration process with the difference that
Tom will now receive a certificate that is required when he requests his ballot from BDC.
Note that the identity of the voter is not recorded in the certificate. When our proposed Evoting system is operated through the Internet, the issued certificate will be a digital
certificate that can be pre-stored in a hardware flash card. This hardware flash card is called
the watchdog device as mentioned in Chapter 2 and is used for identity recognition and
recording online communication transactions between this corresponding specific voter and
election authorities. The flash card does not contain any pre-identified information besides
EC’s certificate. Only EC can access the data stored inside for investigational purposes if
there is a dispute by the specific voter on any voting transactions after the election. The
function of the digital certificate stored in the watchdog is to prove voter eligibility and also
to hide the voter’s identity so that EC cannot link a voter to his/her ballot.

4.2 Time Lock Up the Manifest
Since a certain amount of ballot types are created in the election, we will incorporate the
time-lock and timed-release mechanism introduced in the previous section into our
proposed E-voting system model to prevent malicious authorities from manipulating the
ballot type manifest during the election. All voter jury members will gather together to
form a shared key to lock up the ballot type manifest for at least the duration of the
election. This will prevent a malicious authority such as VCC from manipulating the
ballot type manifest so as to elevate its own candidate to the leading position.
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Here we define this message as the manifest of the whole candidate permutations,
and the certain secure time T is set to be longer than the duration of the election. Since the
candidate permutation is regularized with each ballot type, any modification during the
election is impossible.
We will give a detailed mathematical formulation of the time-lock and timedrelease measurement in next chapter.

4.3 Voter Identity Encryption
If BDC is a malicious authority, another serious attack from BDC may occur if Tom shows
his identification instead of the certificate obtained from EC while he requests the plain
ballot from it. BDC may use this opportunity to link the assigned ballot info with Tom’s
identification. This kind of attack will violate the voter privacy rules in a political election.
To prevent that, we have to use certain measurement to make eligible voters such as Tom
anonymous to BDC while requesting the plain ballots. Therefore, we apply ring signature
to ensure voters’ identity confidentiality. In another word, BDC will not be able to obtain
any identity information from an anonymous ballot requester other than his/her voting
eligibility. When we switch to the online E-voting environment, Tom will still use the
watchdog plugged at his own computer to identify himself as an eligible voter without
releasing any other personal information. The watchdog is also used to record and monitor
the entire online E-voting transactions. Only voting authorities have access to the data
stored in the watchdog if Tom disputes any voting transaction post the election.
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4.4 Ballot Distribution
By using the certificate to verify eligibility from BDC, Tom will receive a plain ballot from
BDC and he will be marked with an electoral ink (such as a semi-permanent ink or dye that
is applied to the forefinger) to indicate that he has already been assigned a ballot. This
measurement successfully protects the voters’ anonymity, prevents voters from voting
more than once, and isolates the assigned ballot and its traceability in the election. When
we apply the proposed E-voting system model through the Internet, the entire ballot
distribution transaction will be recorded in the watchdog device so that Tom cannot request
more than one ballot. The transaction data on the watchdog device can be reviewed to
resolve any dispute after the election.

4.5 Voting
When Tom votes on the ballot, besides the possible attack from malicious authorities
regarding the manifest, we still need to consider possible clash attacks from malicious
authority VCC. In a traditional election, the public bulletin board is the only way for voters
to review and verify the voting result; in our proposed scheme, the public board is
additionally endowed with voting confirmation inquiry and verification responsibility
(shown in Figure 4.2). Voters will mark their own votes on every single part with a systemwide unique confirmation. These confirmations will be published on the public bulletin
board for the public’s inquiry and supervisory purpose. In our proposed E-voting system
model, Tom first checks on the bulletin board to see whether there is a conflict between
confirmations he chose and those already posted by other voters. If so, Tom has to pick up
another new confirmation to replace the conflicted one until all his picks (confirmations on
every single part) are unique. Then, those confirmations will be written on every single part
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one by one and post on the bulletin at the same time for public inquiry, meanwhile, these
confirmations are serving as inquiries and trackers post the election.
With those confirmations on every single part of the original multi-part ballot, the
malicious authority VCC may not be able to manipulate the vote as easily as the way they
did as described in the Clash attack scenario. Because Tom is anonymous after the ballot
distribution phase, it is not traceable for authorities to link the assigned ballot and the
corresponding voter. Back to our example, Tom is anonymous to VCC after he got the
certificate. In the vote audit phase, when Tom sends his confirmations to the authority to
inquire his vote in the final tally, VCC will not be able to locate Tom’s identity but has to
respond with Tom’s actual original votes. If VCC generated more than two exact same
confirmations to different voters to initialize a clash attack, at this time when Tom inquires
the voting result by his confirmations, the response does not match his original vote and
the attack will be detected right away since this is not a one to one mapping’s reverse
procedure.

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

2 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣
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4 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣
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𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2

𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶3
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3 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣
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𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶8

Figure 4.2 The published confirmations on the public bulletin.
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4.6 Ballot Collecting
After Tom marked his choice on the multi-part ballot, he will tear it into individual single
parts (as shown in Figure 4.3) and casts them to VCC. VCC will collect all ballots from all
voters, and then group ballots by categorizing the same marker on each single part and then
tallying the vote according to the type and the sequence number.

Figure 4.3 A sample of single-part portion which shows
Three-candidate race with the marked ones on the top.

4.7 Releasing the Manifest
When the tally result including voters’ confirmations is published on the public bulletin,
the manifest of the ballot types is the only unknown factor in the election. The voter jury
members will get together again and reform the manifest, and then EC will announce the
final vote tally for each candidate according to the necessary ballot information release.
The public bulletin contains all confirmations from all voters. In our example, Tom
can verify his own vote by checking his confirmations with those posted on the public
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bulletin. Tom can also verify the voting result of the election in several different ways from
the public bulletin (details on inquiry related to the security concern will be discussed in
Chapter 4). In addition, a voter’s whole voting process is recorded in this specific voter’s
watchdog device, and this can also prevent the duplicated voting in the election. If Tom
wants to dispute the voting results, he must present his watchdog device containing all
complete voting data transactions to the authority for further investigation.
Besides security features, our protocol also provides a great of diversity and
flexibility for voters and candidates to achieve a fair election environment with self-audit
and self-revise the confirmation. TERM has addressed these concerns by using several
measurements mentioned above.
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CHAPTER 5
MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS

In this chapter, we will provide the mathematical analysis of our proposed system.

5.1 Pre-election
The time-lock and timed-release cryptography used to lock the candidate manifest can be
generalized as below:
Since we have a voter jury to supervise the authority, and this jury is composed of
several volunteer voters. Suppose we have j jury members in the jury. The manifest M
represents the message to be encrypted by the timed-release cryptography. According to
the Secret Sharing method by Shamir, it is divided by j jury members into j shares:
(𝑀𝑀1 , 𝑀𝑀2 , … 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗 ) Array M has the properties of Shamir’s Secret Sharing theory as below:
1.

Knowledge of j or more shares can easily reconstruct M.

2.

Knowledge of less than j shares cannot reconstruct M.

Now we have j jury members to create the time puzzles to encrypt every own share.
By definition, all j members must show up at the time T to decrypt M then the manifest
could be reconstructed. The reason to have multiple members in this scheme instead of
single trusted agent discussed in the Time-lock and Timed-release cryptography is that we
assume any single voter or authorities are not fully trustable. This assumption is practical
in reality as we have seen several cases of political elections disputes. Thus, we introduce
this court-like jury composed of several either voluntary or selective voters to supervise
this time-lock and Timed-released process. These j members will create the time puzzle
as below:
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1.

2.

3.

Each jury member chooses a composite modulus
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖 ∈ (1,2 … 𝑗𝑗)

Calculates the Euler’s totient function:

Ф(𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 ) = (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 − 1)(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 − 1) 𝑖𝑖 ∈ (1,2 … 𝑗𝑗)

Chooses 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖, (1 < 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 < Ф(𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 )), gcd(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 , Ф(𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 )) = 1 randomly, where the

function gcd(.,.) finds the greatest common divisor, such that the inverse exponent 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 that
satisfies:

4.

𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚Ф(𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 )

𝑖𝑖 ∈ (1,2 … 𝑗𝑗)

According to the time-lock puzzle definition, the puzzle factor t can be

calculated by t=TS. We need to emphasize that the puzzle t can be applied to all jury
members because all shares of the manifest M need to be released at the same time to
reconstruct M. And we set T at least to be longer than the election duration.
5.

and

6.

Computes
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 2𝑡𝑡 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 Ф(𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 )
𝑑𝑑′𝑖𝑖 = 2𝑡𝑡 + Ф(𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 ) − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖

Choose a random number 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 (1 < 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 < 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 ) , encrypt 𝑑𝑑′𝑖𝑖 as:
𝑡𝑡

7.

𝐷𝐷′𝑖𝑖 = 𝑑𝑑′𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖2 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛

Then every jury member will publish (𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 , 𝐷𝐷′ 𝑖𝑖 ) instead of (𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 , 𝑑𝑑′𝑖𝑖 ) to the

public. (𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 , 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 ) is the private key of each jury member.
8.

Here, we illustrate that each share of the manifest will be encrypted by every

jury member through their own private key 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 as below:
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𝑒𝑒

𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖

Then we have the time puzzle (𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 , 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , 𝑡𝑡, 𝐷𝐷′ 𝑖𝑖 , 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ). All shares of the manifest have

been encrypted by jury members safely. Neither the public nor authorities could see,

reconstruct or manipulate them, since the public and authorities do not have information
about (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) and it is very hard to factor them. Nobody can calculate the function Ф(𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 )

to get the key of each jury member directly without (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ). There is no faster way to
𝑡𝑡

compute (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖2 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 ) by sequentially starting with 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 and computing t squaring.

For practical purposes, we may ask jury members to form a shared key to encrypt

the manifest or we could divide the manifest into J shares to be encrypted by jury members
to reduce the complexity and time costing.

74

Table 5.1 Notations
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖

𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖

𝑑𝑑′𝑖𝑖

𝐷𝐷′𝑖𝑖
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖

𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖′

𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖′
𝑖𝑖

𝑖𝑖′
𝑗𝑗

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖

𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ′ [𝑗𝑗′ ]
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖′ [𝑗𝑗 ′ ]
𝑤𝑤

𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙
ᵹ𝑖𝑖’

𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖’

The random number chosen by
voter jury member i
The original public key of voter
jury member i
The result of 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 by adding
functions
The encrypted public key of
voter jury member i
The private key of voter jury
member i
′
Voter 𝑖𝑖 personal identification
and other information
Voter 𝑖𝑖 ′ voting group number

The index of voter jury member,
𝑖𝑖 ∈ (1,2 … 𝑗𝑗)
The index of voter
𝑖𝑖′ ∈
(1,2 … 𝑥𝑥)
The number of voter jury
members
The marker on every ballot
representing the type
The encrypted share of manifest
M
The confirmation for voter 𝑖𝑖′ on
candidate 𝑗𝑗′
Voter i’ choice (either 0 or 1)
The number of types of
ballots, 𝑤𝑤 ∈ (1,2 … 𝑦𝑦!)
The group key of EC used for
ring signature to voter 𝑖𝑖′
The public key of each ring
signature members
The random value chosen by
voter 𝑖𝑖′, ᵹ𝑖𝑖’ ∈ [0,1]
The value calculated by f( ) for
voter 𝑖𝑖′

𝑀𝑀

The manifest of the candidate
permutations
The modulus that voter jury member i
gets
Large prime that voter jury member i
chooses
Large prime that voter jury member i
chooses
The reminder of each i’s computation

𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖
𝑆𝑆

The processing speed of the server

𝑡𝑡

The time puzzle factor to create the
puzzle
The time-lock and release puzzle

𝑥𝑥

The number of voters

𝑇𝑇
𝑦𝑦

The number of candidates

𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒 []

The sequence number on a single port

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇

𝑗𝑗′

𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶′

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′
𝑙𝑙

𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖’
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖’
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The tally result for TPw

The tally contains votes
for𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗′
The index of candidates, 𝑗𝑗′ ∈
(1,2 … 𝑦𝑦)
The certification of voter 𝑖𝑖′

The number of voters in a ring
signature
Hash value of voter 𝑖𝑖′’s calculation

The random value chosen by voter 𝑖𝑖′

5.2 Voter Registration and Ballot Distribution
We will continue our mathematical formulation of the voting process after the time-lock
and timed-release cryptography has been successfully applied. Suppose there are x voters
participating in the election with y candidates:
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖′ : Voter 𝑖𝑖 ′ group number; 𝑖𝑖 ′ ∈ (1,2 … 𝑥𝑥)

𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖′ : Voter 𝑖𝑖 ′ personal identification and basic information required for the election

registration;

𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖′ [𝑗𝑗 ′ ]: Voter i’ choice (either 0 or 1), where 𝑗𝑗 ′ is from 1 to y. To improve the

security level, every type of ballot may have the reversed definition of its corresponding
choice. For example, in the election, we have several types of ballots, some types of ballots

may define “0” for voting “yes” and “1” for voting “no” while the others may reverse the
definition, “0” for voting “no” and “1” for voting “yes”.
The voting process can be generalized as below:
Step 1: Voter i’ sends data array (𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖′ , 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖′ ) to EC for registration. EC will authorize

his/her voting privilege and a certification 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′ will be assigned to him/her by EC. Voters’
anonymity is well protected with this ring signature cryptography during the ballot

distribution phase. The reason why we use ring signature scheme instead of group signature
is due to the advantage of ring signature’s property. The group manager of a group signature
may conspire and become corrupted to compromise voter anonymity. In a ring signature,
rings are geometric regions with uniform periphery without center controlling behaviors,
ring signature can be powerful once members of ring want to be independent.
Step 2: EC will not distribute the certificate 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′ or the key 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′ used for the ring

signature scheme to voter i’ only after voter i’ passes EC’s voter registration check. After
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voter i’ receives 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′ and 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′ from EC, voter i’ will have all public keys of each group
member (𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′ , 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1 , 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2 , … , 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 ),
Let

Ɵ = (𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′ , 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1 , 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2 , … , 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 )

be the list of public keys. Voter i’ calculates the signature by using an independent
cryptographic hash function:
𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖’ = Hash (Ɵ)

Voter i’ chooses a set of random values 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖’ as a generator for all other ring

members. A random value ᵹ𝑖𝑖’ is also selected from [0, 1], then 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖’ is calculated according
to the following equation:

𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖’ = 𝑓𝑓(𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖’ ) (1≤ i’ ≤l, i’≠ i’,)
𝑏𝑏𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′ = 𝑓𝑓(𝑢𝑢𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′ )

𝑓𝑓(. ) and 𝑓𝑓 −1 (. ) are a pair of function/inverse function. After voter i’ uses Eq.

above to calculate all 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖′ (1≤ i’≤l, i’≠ i’,) required to form a ring signature, voter s will solve

for 𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠 to form:

𝜓𝜓� 𝑦𝑦𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′ , 𝑏𝑏1, , 𝑏𝑏2 , … , 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖’ , … , 𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙 , 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′ , 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖’ � = ᵹ𝑖𝑖’

Furthermore,

𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖’ = 𝑓𝑓 −1 (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖’ )

signature.

𝜓𝜓 (.) is used to verify the signature according to the definition of the ring

Finally, the ring signature is generated as:
(Ɵ , ᵹ𝑖𝑖’ , 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′ , 𝑢𝑢𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′ , 𝑢𝑢1 , 𝑢𝑢2 , … , 𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙 )

Step 3: After BDC receives this ring signature
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(Ɵ , ᵹ𝑖𝑖’ , 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′ , 𝑢𝑢𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′ , 𝑢𝑢1 , 𝑢𝑢2 , … , 𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙 ) from voter, BDC will verify the value by

checking:

𝜓𝜓� 𝑏𝑏𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′ , 𝑏𝑏1, , 𝑏𝑏2 , … , 𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙 , 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′ , 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖’ � = ᵹ𝑖𝑖’

Obviously, this ring signature contains EC’s key information and the certificate
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′ . If this signature passes the check, it means that this voter is eligible since EC only

distributes its own certificate to the eligible voters.

5.3 Ballot Casting and Vote Counting
Step 4: After voter i’ casts the vote, the voting data (𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ′ [1], 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 [1], 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤 , 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ′ [1] ),
(𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ′ [2], 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 [2], 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤 , 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ′ [2] ), ..., (𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ′ [𝑦𝑦], 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 [𝑦𝑦], 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤 , 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ′ [𝑦𝑦] )

will be sent to VCC. The binary array 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ′ represents the encrypted choices of 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 ′ [𝑗𝑗 ′ ] with

authorities’ public key, and 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ′ [𝑗𝑗′ ] (1≤ 𝑗𝑗 ′ ≤ y) is a set of unique random numbers defined
as confirmations that voters may use for tracking purpose. This set of confirmation numbers

also can help prevent the clash attack from malicious authorities as discussed above. 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 [𝑗𝑗 ′ ]
(1≤ 𝑗𝑗 ′ ≤ y) is the sequence number on every single-part portion of the multi-part ballot. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤
(1<w<y!) is the encrypted marker representing the ballot type.

Step 5: Voter i’ saves all 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 ′ [𝑗𝑗′ ] as the receipt for cast vote. Array 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ′ is used for

vote tracking and inquiry purposes post the election. It also can be observed and checked
by anyone beyond voters.

Step 6: After receiving all the ballots, VCC groups all portions according to 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤 .

Then, VCC uses its private key to decrypt the entire encoded data array 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ′ to count the
votes in plain data form without any candidate info.
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While VCC tallies the votes:
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤

= ((��𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ′ [1], 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ′ [1] �, ��𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ′ [2], 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ′ [2] � , … , �(𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ′ [𝑦𝑦], 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ′ [𝑦𝑦] )) , 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤 )

The corresponding confirmations will be stored separately along with the votes for

each candidate in the election database as below:
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1 = �� 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ′ [𝑗𝑗′ ] � , ��(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1 )𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ′

�

𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦 = �� 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ′ [𝑗𝑗′ ] � , ��(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦 )𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ′

�

𝑖𝑖 [𝑗𝑗′ ]

…………………..

𝑖𝑖 [𝑗𝑗′ ]

Here, (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 ….𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦 ) represents the set of candidates. 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ′
𝑗𝑗

stores those data related to every vote cast for candidate 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗′ (1≤ 𝑗𝑗 ′ ≤ y) along with its

respective confirmation. ∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ′ [𝑗𝑗′ ] represents the gathering of confirmations for every

candidate, i.e., ∑(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗′ )𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ′

𝑖𝑖 [𝑗𝑗′ ]

(1≤ 𝑗𝑗 ′ ≤ y)is the final tally of all votes for candidate 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗′ .

We need to emphasize that 𝑖𝑖 ′ (1≤ 𝑖𝑖 ′ ≤ x) presented in the final tally for ∑(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗′ )𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ′

𝑖𝑖 [𝑗𝑗′ ]

may vary as voters’ choices may vary. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤 will then be published on the public
bulletin, but the mapping for each type of ballot or the actual candidate permutation on
the manifest is still unrevealed.
Step 7: Since the time-lock and timed-release scheme has securely protected the
manifest, each jury voter uses his/her own key to decrypt his share of the manifest. After
all shares get decrypted and put together, they can be used to reconstruct the manifest and
will be published to the public and the bulletin. Meanwhile, if any voter wants to verify
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the manifest before it is released, it still takes T period to calculate the public key of each
jury voter which is 𝑑𝑑 ′ 𝑖𝑖 where 𝑖𝑖 ∈ (1,2 … 𝑗𝑗) .
5.4 Vote Tracking
If Voter i' wants to verify whether his/her vote have been counted correctly, he/she can
check the corresponding 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ′ [𝑗𝑗′ ] in 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ′ . Since voter i' is anonymous during
𝑗𝑗

the ballot distribution phase, the authority will not be able to identify the actual inquirer but

have to provide the confirmation 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ′ [𝑗𝑗′ ] received and its associated vote. Note, the

response from the authority must match what voter i' has created and recorded earlier, or it

will be detected by this anonymous inquirer (voter i' ). This procedure ensures that each
vote will be counted without being altered in the final tally.
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CHAPTER 6
ADDITIONAL SECURITY FEATURES

Security is always one of the crucial factors when we evaluate any E-voting system. In this
chapter, we will evaluate TERM in both security and performance aspects.

6.1 Security Analysis and Case Study
To counteract possible attacks from authorities or hackers through the Internet, we will
introduce additional security features to our E-voting system.

6.1.1

The T time length in Time-lock and Timed-release scheme

We have described the Time-lock and Timed-release schemes in Section 3.6. The secure
time period T is determined by the duration of the election, and then the length of the key
is determined by T and the processing speed of the processor at the server side. We ask
the voter jury to setup the period T together to secure the manifest, so that each voter jury
member has the same T value to process and releases the Time-lock at the same time.
Figure 6.1 is shown the time frame for the voter jury members to encrypt their own keys
to time-lock a message. In reality, the processing speed at each voter jury member may
vary. The situation will become more complicated if these jury members’ time-lock cannot
be released at the same time.
The key size of K equals to by ⌈𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2 (2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)⌉ according to the definition. Suppose

the secure period we want is 3 days which means T=259200 second, and we assume the
processing speed is 3.4Gbps, then we get K= ⌈𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2 (2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)⌉ = ⌈53.95⌉=54, which means
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the lower bound of the size of K is 54 (Kim, 2010). For any key with a length of 128 bits,
it will be long enough to be used as the time-lock and timed-release key.
Time to lock

Time to release
𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗
𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗−1

𝑇𝑇2
𝑇𝑇1

Figure 6.1 The time lock is locked by all voter jury members
with same time puzzle.

The formulation defined in (Kim, 2010) gives us:
K=lg(2ST)
We can conclude from the above calculation that the longer the key size, the more
complexity it will bring into the scheme. Therefore, we need to optimize the calculation
and reduce the complexity of the time-lock and timed-release scheme. We have several
options as below.
The first option is to set up several jury members, but each one has a different T
secure period as shown in Figure 6.2. Since we have j voter jury members. As long as the
first jury member 𝑗𝑗1 begins to setup the period required for time-lock and timed-release

scheme, other (j-1) jury members can set up their own time puzzles in turns rather than at
the same time. The length of the time puzzle calculated by 𝑗𝑗1 is 𝑇𝑇1 . Then when the second
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jury member sets the key, the time puzzle of 𝑇𝑇2 can be reduced to (𝑇𝑇 − 𝑇𝑇1 ). It’s obvious
that the computational complexity for the second jury member 𝑗𝑗2 is reduced. Similarly, we

𝑖𝑖−1
have each jury member 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ’s time puzzle is equal to (𝑇𝑇 − ∑𝑘𝑘=1
𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘 ) (1≤ 𝑖𝑖≤ j). Each jury

member’s time puzzle is decreased so that a faster computation can be achieved while the
security level of the system remains same.

Another option is to have each jury member in charge of a certain length of the
𝑗𝑗
secured period time 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 . (1≤ 𝑖𝑖≤ j) and ∑𝑖𝑖=1 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 >T, and each jury member 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 (1 < 𝑖𝑖 < 𝑗𝑗) ’s

secured period must overlap at least two neighbor members except that the first and last

jury member’ 𝑇𝑇1 and 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 , respectively. These two jury members only have one overlap

with his/her neighbor jury member. Figure 6.3 shows the time-lock and timed-release
scheme with less complexity on the key size.

Time to lock

Time to release
𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗
𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗−1

𝑇𝑇2
𝑇𝑇1

Figure 6.2 The time lock is locked by all voter jury members
with decreased time puzzle.
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Time to lock

Time to release
𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗
𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗−1

𝑇𝑇2
𝑇𝑇1

Figure 6.3 The time lock is locked by all voter jury members
with overlapped time puzzle.

6.1.2

Inquiry from Voter and Through the Public Bulletin

This dissertation has discussed a clash attack prevention scheme, which could restrict
manipulating activities from the malicious authority (EC, BDC or VCC). In this scenario,
the confirmations are used by voters to track and verify the voting results in the final tally.
Each confirmation actually can be composed of a set of numbers or characters. These
confirmations can be originally generated from an authority’s database, and they must have
a one to one association with the corresponding assigned ballot. In our proposed E-voting
system model, the voter must inquire whether those confirmations he/she will use conflict
with other voters’ in the system before casting his/her vote. At this moment, the election
authority does not know what the voter will exactly vote. Then, it is very risky and
unpredictable for the malicious authority to respond with a false inquiry result and
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duplicate the same confirmation to different voters at this step. Since the malicious
authority cannot predict what and who these voters will exactly vote for after having been
assigned confirmations. As voters are anonymous at the ballot distribution phase, their
identities will remain anonymous when they obtain these confirmations from the authority
along with the plain ballots. The voters may either modify or keep those assigned
confirmations as long as they remain unique in the election’s database. It is the voters’
responsibility to inquire the database again to make sure that the intended new
confirmations are still unique after their modifications on confirmations. All these
confirmations can be served as receipts for voters to track their votes after the ballot casting
phase.
If any voter wants to inquire his/her own vote from the authority in the final tally,
he/she only needs to provide and send the corresponding confirmation’s information
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1 , 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐2 , … 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦 ) to the authority, and the authority has to respond with the inquirer’s
original vote to the inquirer accordingly.

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

2 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣

𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵

4 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2

𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶3

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶5

3 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶4

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶6

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶7

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶9

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶8

Figure 6.4 The published confirmations on the public bulletin.
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The public bulletin is used to record and publish all votes along with each
corresponding confirmation as shown in Fig 6.4. Voters may check from this bulletin to
see if there are any duplicated confirmations or whether the total number of votes and
confirmations match the number of actually participated voters.

This method has

empowered the voters to monitor and supervise the election.

6.2 Performance Analysis
In this section, we will evaluate the performance of our work to demonstrate how it can
help provision the security features, reliability, and trust-worthiness of E-voting system.
The proposed work can protect against the clash attack which falls into the category of a
receipt-based attack by utilizing a multi-part ballot method along with voter-selected
unique confirmations. We assume that if malicious authorities or hackers are able to
intercept the packets transmitted through the Internet successfully, then our methodology
will be the last protection measurement to stop hackers from obtaining the content of
single-part portions to reconstruct the complete multi-part ballot. Thus, its proper design is
very important to ensure the fairness and privacy for the whole political election. To
demonstrate the performance of our methodology, let us calculate the probability that
malicious authorities and hackers can successfully reconstruct the ballots and manipulate
the votes during the election. Here any instance of a voter’s vote that can be correctly
revealed by a hacker from any single part of the multi-part ballot is considered as a
successful attack.
The following three analysis methods are considered:
The probability of successfully reconstructing a single-part portion of a specific
voter’s vote among the entire voting pool:
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We denote y as the number of candidates; x as the number of voters. If a hacker or
a malicious authority wants to initiate an attack on the vote of a specific voter, it requires
1

getting 3 factors: the probability of successfully identifying this specific voter is𝑥𝑥. Then

since we have y! types of a multi-part ballot and this voter must have used one of them, the
probability of successfully identifying the correct multi-part ballot type is

1

𝑦𝑦!

. The

possibility of a successful hack on this voter’s choice on a single-part portion of the ballot,
1

either 0 or 1, is 2 . Thus the probability of successfully attacking a specific voter’s vote is:
1 1 1
1
∗ ∗ =
𝑦𝑦! 2 𝑥𝑥 2𝑥𝑥 ∗ 𝑦𝑦!

The probability of successfully reconstructing a single-part portion of a specific
voter’s vote with respect to a specific candidate:
Here we still have y candidates and x voters. Compared with the previous case, we
1

need an extra factor to locate this specific candidate, thus an extra 𝑦𝑦 (from y candidates)

will be applied as shown below:

1 1 1 1
1
∗ ∗ ∗ =
𝑦𝑦! 𝑦𝑦 2 𝑥𝑥 2𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ∗ 𝑦𝑦!

The probability of successfully reconstructing a valid ballot from all single parts of
the ballots is:
1

(𝑦𝑦!)𝑦𝑦

∗ 𝑦𝑦!

If malicious authorities or hackers successfully intercept the data packet containing
a single-part portion of a ballot, and want to intercept the second single-part portion from
the same ballot to reconstruct the original multi-part ballot, the successful probability to
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1

1

achieve this goal is 𝑦𝑦! (𝑦𝑦−1). We deduce this number as follows: the probability of obtaining
1

the second single-part portion in the same type as the first one is 𝑦𝑦!, and the sequence

number of this single-part portion must be different from that of the first single-part portion
1

from the same multi-part ballot, thus a probability factor 𝑦𝑦−1 is applied after. With the same
principle, we can determine that the probability of successfully reconstructing the third
single-part portion from the same ballot to reconstruct the original multi-part ballot is
1

1

1

. Here 𝑦𝑦−2 is applied as the sequence number of the third single-part portion must

𝑦𝑦! (𝑦𝑦−2)

be different from that of the first and second sequence number on the single-part portion.
So on so forth thus the probability of successfully attacking the (y-1)th single-part portion
1

1

1

that could be used to reconstruct the original multi-part ballot is 𝑦𝑦! (𝑦𝑦−(𝑦𝑦−1)) = 𝑦𝑦!. Therefore,

the probability of reconstructing an original multi-part ballot from any hacked or existing
1

known single-part portion is (𝑦𝑦!)𝑦𝑦−1 ∗(𝑦𝑦−1)!, deduced as below:

1
1
1
1
1 1
1
∗
∗ ∗
∗…∗ ∗ =
𝑦𝑦! (𝑦𝑦 − 1) 𝑦𝑦! (𝑦𝑦 − 2)
𝑦𝑦! 1 (𝑦𝑦!)𝑦𝑦−1 ∗ (𝑦𝑦 − 1)!
1

A probability factor 𝑦𝑦∗𝑦𝑦! also needs to be applied, as the malicious authority and

hacker may randomly pick the first single-part portion, which can be among y! types of
multi-part ballots, and can be among one of N sequence numbers in one multi-part ballot.
Thus the final probability of successfully reconstructing an original multi-part ballot is
shown below:
1
1
1
∗
=
𝑦𝑦−1
𝑦𝑦
𝑦𝑦 ∗ 𝑦𝑦! (𝑦𝑦!)
∗ (𝑦𝑦 − 1)! (𝑦𝑦!) ∗ 𝑦𝑦!
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Note that the calculated result refers to the probability of reconstructing a
voter’s valid multi-part ballot. This voter could be any participating voter; if the
hacker wants to reconstruct a valid multi-part of a specific voter, the probability
would be much lower than the one we presented. On the typical ballot used in
presidential elections, the number of candidates will be around 10 to 20 including
the local, state, and congressional races. We choose the number of candidates
from 2 to 14 for illustration and analysis purpose, and summarize the
corresponding probability for malicious authorities and hackers to successfully
reconstruct an original multi-part ballot in Table 6.1. Figure 6.5 and 6.6,
respectively plot the probability curve accordingly.

Figure 6.5 Probability of successfully attacking a specific voter’s vote for
x=1000, 2000, 3000 while y is from 2 to 14.
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Figure 6.6 Probability of successfully attacking a specific voter’s vote with the
respect to a specific candidate
when x=1000, 2000, 3000 while y is from 2 to 14.

Table 6.1 Probability of Reconstructing a Valid Original Multi-part ballot with Different
Number of Candidates
# of Candidates
Successful Probability
5.02 ∗ 10−7

4

5.98 ∗ 10−20

6

2.84 ∗ 10−41

8

6.96 ∗ 10−72

10

1.71 ∗ 10−112

12

1.09 ∗ 10−163

14
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

Compared with previous works, TERM has exhibited the following important advantages:
(1) The probability of successfully reconstructing a ballot by malicious authorities
or hackers is close to zero.
(2) Setting up a secured time period limits any possible manipulation by malicious
authorities.
(3) Creating a confirmation can prevent possible clash attack carried out by
malicious authorities.

Other advantages of TERM are summarized as below:
Anonymity: In the ballot distribution phase, the voter’s identity is not associated
with the ballot received from BDC.
Verification: The confirmations chosen by voter can be used to track and verify
his/her vote in the final tally. These confirmations are unique and exclusive to this specific
voter who is still anonymous to the authorities. Any un-matching result will be detected
immediately during the inquiry process.
Privacy: Our performance analysis shows that the probability of reconstructing an
original multi-part ballot by malicious authorities is close to zero as long as the number of
candidates is above a certain number. For example, if the number of participating
candidates in the election is 14 (a typical number for presidential elections in the USA
including senate and house of representative, the probability of successfully reconstructing
an original multi-part ballot from those single-part portions is 1.09 ∗ 10−163 .

Confidentiality: The manifest will remain undisclosed during the vote counting
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procedure, to prevent any manipulation in the vote counting phase.
Security: Using a ballot that separates the candidates’ name and voters’ vote
enhance the security requirement in the E-voting system.
Recordable and traceable transactions via the watchdog device: The watchdog
device records the entire E-voting transactions. The authorities may use it to investigate
any dispute such as mismatched voting choices claimed by the voters.
This dissertation describes a framework for developing an integrated E-voting
system with diverse security features, several areas of this research can be expanded in the
future:
(1) Voters choosing the ballot type: Before the election begins, election authorities
will publish the types of the ballot that will be used in the election. Voters can
select and choose one of the published ballot types randomly to cast the vote.
(2) Addition performance analysis are needed so that the E-voting protocol can be
implemented for large-scale elections in the future.
In this dissertation, we have presented an overview of our proposed E-voting
system model, TERM, which mitigates a number of security concerns such as ballot
reconstruction, vote manipulation, tampering permutation list of candidates, and clash
attack from malicious authorities; at the same time, it provisions a secured vote verification
mechanism and can further mitigate those issues by utilizing a decentralized ballot
collecting process along with a vote verification feature to better protect both candidates’
and voter’s confidentiality. The 2016 U.S. presidential election has raised awareness of
many serious issues such as voter fraud, voting machines manipulation (Kaleem, 2016),
software glitch (Durden, 2016), untrustable authority and hackers. Our proposed TERM
can readily mitigate some of these issues, and provide a leap forward in ensuring a fair
and democratic voting process for future elections.
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